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In the United States there is a shortage of affordable housing or even worse, a crisis in 
affordable housing. Since the 1970’s, there has been a huge reduction in the number of low 
rent units in the housing stock and a sharp increase in the number of poor families. The result 
is an unbalance between supply and demand, leading to higher rents and higher rent burdens. 
Especially people with low income suffer from the shortage of affordable housing.   
 
The Chicago Metropolitan Area is also facing a shortage of affordable housing. In addition 
the region experiences housing value increases that effectively exclude moderate or low 
income households. Over the last decades the spatial organization and location of suburban 
municipalities has developed into a geographic segmentation and clustering of housing by 
value. Zoning barriers made by suburbs, which exclude new housing for working families 
near their jobs have only strengthen these geographic segmentation.   
 
As a result in 2004 the state of Illinois introduced a mandate called the Illinois Affordable 
Housing Planning and Appeal Act to increase the supply of housing for low- and moderate-
income families in every local jurisdiction. In 2005, the Illinois Housing Development 
Authority (IHDA) identified 49 Chicago suburban municipalities that did not comply to the 
mandate, they had not enough affordable housing. As a result, they had to make an affordable 
housing plan with strategies to facilitate more affordable housing in their community. The 
most of the 49 communities are prosperous and have not been actively involved in affordable 
housing in the last 50 years. City officials have shown some defensiveness towards the 
mandate and made the plans with the minimum required.  
 
In this study the objective is to analyse if the affordable housing mandate has changed the 
attitude of suburban cities in the Chicago Metropolitan Area towards affordable housing 
policy  
 
The enactment of the mandate in 2004 resulted in that a discussion has been started in the 
municipalities that fall under the mandate. The mandate focused attention on the for 
municipalities unpopular affordable housing issue. Also, affordable housing agencies have Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
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made efforts to encourage the noncompliant municipalities to take action and tried to make 
them more aware of the affordable housing problems.  
 
However, the mandate consists of some disadvantages. The first problem of the Illinois 
Affordable Housing Planning and Appeal Act is that it is an unfunded mandate and that is one 
of the reasons why the mandate is not popular by most of the municipalities. As a result of the 
lack of state funding, municipalities have to fund their own money in the facilitation of 
affordable housing. The possibility is that, because of the lack of state funding, not much 
efforts will be placed by municipalities to facilitate affordable housing. 
 
Further the mandate misses state incentives to encourage municipalities to take action. Not 
only compliance and attention of the affordable housing problem is enough. Especially in 
suburbs for which affordable housing is not a main issue, incentives are required. From the 
study it is clear that collaboration and technical assistance are also important aspects to create 
more commitment for local governments to support the mandate. The state offers some 
technical assistance, but there is no sufficient cooperation between the municipalities and 
state level.  
 
Also there are problems with home rule communities which say the act does not apply to 
them, as planning is something where the state can have no interference on. Home rule 
communities have a certain degree of local power, and they claim affordable housing is a 
local issue. However, affordable housing is not an important issue in the prosperous suburbs, 
priorities are more focused to satisfy the needs of the high-income residents.  
 
Another issue is that tax base is important for the suburban communities. Most of tax 
revenues of a municipality comes from their local community. High income households are 
paying more taxes and are in need of less services than that low-income households do. 
Therefore, city officials prefer to attract high-income households above than low-income 
households. Also there are fears from city officials that because of the development of 
affordable housing, housing prices will drop or high-income households will vote with their 
feet and move away.  However, studies have shown that the development of affordable 
housing will not undermine housing values.  
 Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
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The prosperous suburb Highland Park is a positive exception among the 49 noncompliant 
suburbs. This community has been active with affordable housing from the 1970s and shows 
with their detailed affordable housing plan their commitment to the act. Nonetheless the city 
planner of Highland Park states that the mandate misses the required incentives and funds to 
become a successful tool to encourage municipalities to facilitate affordable housing.   
 
Where in the US local governments have more autonomy and home rule provisions resulting 
in more responsibilities and policies, this is different in the Netherlands. The Netherlands 
have a more top-down with policies from above, although it is getting more decentralized. 
Affordable housing is not an important issue in local politics in the US, as this study shows in 
the prosperous suburbs. Dutch governments are far more active in facilitating affordable 
housing, trying to provide housing for low and moderate income households. 
 
An overall conclusion that could be drawn is that the mandate has created some awareness 
among the 49 suburban municipalities about the affordable housing issues, but the mandate 
needs to be improved to force municipalities to be more involved in the affordable housing 
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In the United States there is a shortage of affordable housing or even worse, a crisis in 
affordable housing (Feldman, 2002). Since the 1970’s, there has been a huge reduction in the 
number of low rent units in the housing stock and a sharp increase in the number of poor 
families (Nelson, 1994). The result is an unbalance between supply and demand, leading to 
higher rents and higher rent burdens. Especially people with low income suffer from the 
shortage of affordable housing.  These developments led also to an increasing number of 
homeless families on the street, which makes it the most dramatic evidence of this housing 
crisis (Nelson, 1994).   
 
An affordable housing state mandate could be a good initiative to make local governments 
more aware of the affordable housing problem, in order that they will make affordable 
housing plans and encourage local actors to develop more affordable housing. A problem is 
that mainly prosperous suburban municipalities are resistant to the affordable housing 
mandates. However, a mandate could make these municipalities more aware of the affordable 
housing problem and make a change in their attitude and view towards affordable housing 
policies. In this study the main question is if the affordable housing mandate is changing the 
attitude of city officials from prosperous suburban municipalities towards affordable housing 
policy. In this study especially the attitude of home rule communities will be discussed, 
because those communities have a certain degree of autonomous power and it could be 
interesting to see how they perceive a state mandate.  
 
The Metropolitan Area of Chicago is a clear example where prosperous suburban 
municipalities are resistant to the mandate to facilitate affordable housing in their community. 
In 2004 the state of Illinois introduced a mandate called the Illinois Affordable Housing 
Planning and Appeal Act to increase the supply of housing for low- and moderate-income 
families in every local jurisdiction. In 2005, the Illinois Housing Development Authority 
(IHDA) identified 49 Chicago suburban municipalities that did not comply to the mandate, 
they had not enough affordable housing. As a result, they had to make an affordable housing 
plan to comply to the mandate. Charles Hoch analysed the consequences of this state wide 
affordable housing planning mandate in Illinois. He made a survey in the Chicago 
Metropolitan Area to analyze the response of the 49 prosperous suburban municipalities Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
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which did not comply to the mandate (Hoch, 2007).  Many of these municipalities were 
resistant to the mandate.  
 
The planning system in the Netherlands is very different from the United States. The central 
government has more influence on housing and the housing stock has a much bigger share of 
social housing than in the United States. For a reflection it will be interesting how the United 
States and the Netherlands differ from each other concerning planning and housing.  
 
The question is if the Illinois Affordable Housing Planning and Appeal Act will shift the 
attention of city officials of prosperous suburban municipalities towards affordable housing 
policy. Is it legitimate for a municipality to deny a state-level mandate, without 
acknowledging the affordable housing issue? The fear from affordable housing agencys is that 
the noncompliant municipalities may as well make the required plans, but will do nothing 
further with it.   
 
This results in the following problem: 
 
Definition of the problem: 
 
-  Many  prosperous suburban municipalities  in the Chicago Metropolitan Area have 
little affordable housing and the most of them are defensive  towards  the Illinois 
affordable housing mandate.  
 
This problem definition results in the following study objective:  
 
-  The objective is to analyse if the state-level affordable housing mandate has changed 
the attitude of suburban cities in the Chicago Metropolitan Area towards affordable 
housing policy. 
  
The main question in this study is:  
 Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
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-  Has the process of complying with the Illinois Housing Planning Mandate changed 
the way suburban cities in the Chicago Metropolitan Area are approaching affordable 
housing policy? 
 
The main question has the following sub-questions: 
-    How can state planning mandates be used to improve planning policies on a local 
level? 
-  How are state and local government levels related to each other regarding planning? 
-  Why are many city officials resistant to redistributive policy, such as affordable 
housing programmes? 
-  What is the attitude of  city officials from  prosperous suburban municipalities in the 
Chicago Metropolitan Area towards the Illinois Affordable Housing Planning and 
Appeal Act? 
-  How does the  Dutch housing situation reflect on the US housing situation? 
 
Methodology 
     
This study will be supported by literature about public choice theory and literature about 
resistance of city decision-makers to redistributive policies, such as a housing mandate and 
what kind of discourses there exists of how local governments perceive redistributive policies. 
To get more background of the intergovernmental relations it would be interesting to analyze 
the state influence on the local government and how these two levels are related.  Does the 
state has the right to force local governments to develop affordable housing by using a 
mandate? The concept of home rule will be an important issue in this case. Also  literature 
will be given about planning mandates in general, and especially the affordable housing 
mandate that is in effect in the state of Illinois. The study of Charles Hoch will be a starting-
point for this study and especially for the case study. Hoch analyzed how local officials 
responded to the mandate. In this study it could be interesting to analyze if the process of 
complying with the Illinois Affordable Housing and Planning Act changed the way how local 
officials in suburban Chicago are approaching affordable housing policy. In order to get a 
more detailed insight in the affordable housing mandate issue and the planning making 
process on a local level, a case study will be done in one of the 49 prosperous suburban 
municipalities of Chicago that falls under the mandate, called Highland Park. It is a Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
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municipality that is actively involved in affordable housing plans and one prosperous 
municipality that is resistant to the mandate. It will be interesting to analyze what their 
approach is towards affordable housing. Also some other communities and their affordable 
housing plan will be discussed.  
 
To get information about Highland Park an interview has been done with a city official. A 
state official has also been interviewed to find out his view about the affordable housing 
mandate. To give a more diverse selection of interviewees, affordable housing agencies, 
which try to promote affordable housing in the suburban region of Chicago has been 
questioned. Of course Charles Hoch is interviewed, because he did the research on the 
affordable housing mandate in Illinois. This information should give a good overview of the 
attitude of local governments towards the affordable housing mandate. 
 
From the perspective of the Dutch housing and planning situation, it will be interesting to 
make a brief comparison between the US and the Netherlands. That is why a chapter is 
included about these differences. However, the main part of this study is on the attitude of 
suburban municipalities towards the Illinois affordable housing mandate.  
 
  Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
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2.  Local public policy choices 
 
 
This section will discuss the role of the local government regarding local policy choices and 
how this affects the decision-making process. The public choice theory will be a basis in  
providing an explanation for policy choices on a local level. Also local autonomy, Dillon’s 
rule and home rule will be discussed. 
 
 
As already mentioned in the introduction, the United States governance is decentralized. 
Because of the reduction in federal funding from the end of the 1970’s more policy control is 
concentrated on a local level (Basolo, 1999-1). The federal government reduced spending on 
domestic programs, mainly programs from the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development. The cuttings in the federal budget implies that the future of several programs 
from the federal government is in danger and with that the future of low-income families. 
Also this implies that on a local level, the local government will need to look to new 
partnerships, new ideas and innovations, that do not necessary rely on federal help (Bohm, 
2005). The reduction of federal funding means that local governments have a lot of 
responsibility to decide on what to spend its money and it can set its own priorities. Many 
public choice theorists predict that cities will not support local affordable programs, because 
city officials seek to provide the best cost-to-benefit ratio for their community to attract 
residents and to keep their tax base. This economic self-interest by cities results in a resistance 
to redistributive programs like affordable housing programs (Basolo, 1999-2). To get more 
control and/or try to solve problems on the local level, states try with for example planning 
mandates to influence the plan making on a local level. Local governments may be defensive 
towards planning mandates and come up with reasons for their own benefit not to cooperate 
with the mandate. The reasons behind this self-interest of local governments will be explained 
with the public choice theory. 
 
2.1 Public choice theory 
The basis of the public choice theory is the concept of the Homo economicus, that a ‘man is 
an egoistic, rational utility maximizer’ (Mueller, 1979: p.1). The public choice theory derives 
from neo-classical models of economic behaviour. These assume that producers in economic 
markets are driven by selfishness and that competition can channel self-interested behaviour 
towards the common good. Public choice theorists argue that policy makers in the public Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
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sector go for their own interests too. However, competition can redirect the attention of policy 
makers towards the general welfare of society (Boyne, 1998).  
 
When discussing research based on the public choice theory, the works of Tiebout (1956), 
Peterson (1981), and Schneider (1989), are important.  Tiebout (1956) argues that a local 
government structure with many small units can provide a solution based on economic 
reasoning to the problem of matching local policies to public preferences. In a fragmented 
local government system, each unit must compete effectively in order to retain existing 
households and firms, to attract new customers in the local government marketplace. In 
Tiebout’s model, residents have unlimited mobility and have several preferences for public 
goods and services (Camões, 2003). Individuals choose to live in a community that 
maximises their preferences for local services. Local politicians have to respond to the 
demands of voters, by offering low taxes and a high quantity and quality of services to attract 
residents. Local politicians who fail to deliver a good ratio of service benefits to tax costs will 
probably lose residents and with this a reduction of their tax base. Residents will ‘vote with 
their feet’ if their preferences will not be met by the local politicians, which is a strong 
incentive for competition (Tiebout, 1956)  In reality cities will try to deliver the best 
benefit/cost ratio for public goods and services to keep and attract residents. As a result city 
officials will avoid redistributive programs like affordable housing programs, because this 
may result in a loss of residents (Basolo, 1999-1).  
 
The model of Tiebout has been under discussion by some scholars. Camoes (2003) criticizes 
Tiebout’s model by saying that the model has unrealistic assumptions. One of Tiebout’s 
assumptions is that an individual has full mobility and that local communities have full 
knowledge. No-one has full mobility, not everybody has the opportunity to get from A to B. 
A more important assumption is that Tiebout´s model assumes that local governments are 
entirely independent concerning the choice of local public goods and services. So, Tiebout 
assumes they have complete autonomy to make policy decisions. However, this is not the 
case, because local governments have to deal with other levels of government, like state and 
federal government (Camões, 2003). Otherwise, if the preferences of the residents were 
denied by higher government on what local governments could do, the model would not make 
sense (Clark, 1984). Clark (1984) criticized Tiebout model, because he is questioning 
Tiebout’s theory of local government. “The most obvious answer is that the Tiebout Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
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hypothesis has no theory of the state.” (Clark, 1984: p.202). In the Tiebout’ model, local 
government can hardly be seen as an institution, because it has no organizational structure, 
“no real “interests” or agendas and no real power” (p. 202) Clark argues. Although this 
criticism, Tiebout’s model has been a important model for many scholars using public choice 
theory. 
 
One of them is Peterson (1981). Peterson uses Tiebout’s model further to explain residential 
choice and local public decision making. He argues that policy decisions in American cities 
are mainly shaped by their position within the American system of government. Therefore, 
local governments provide several public services such as police and fire protection and 
cultural amenities. In cooperation with other levels of government, cities provide major 
welfare state services such as public health, education, social services, housing, etc. (Saiz, 
1999).   
 
Peterson further makes the point that “city politics is limited politics”, which means that local 
governments
 
“are limited in what they can do” (Peterson, 1981: 4). Local government can 
offer different benefit/cost ratios to their residents. The diversity of goods and services offered 
by cities creates a market for public goods. Residents will consider the public services before 
locating in the community that offers the best combination of services and levels of taxes that 
most satisfies their preferences. Peterson stresses that cities go for maximizing the resident’s 
benefit/tax ratio, but they are limited by the freedom of residents to choose for another city. 
So city officials have to be aware of the demands of the residents and will try to offer better 
services and goods than neighbouring cities. This results in intercity competition to attract 
residents (Camões, 2003).  
 
Following Tiebout’s model, Peterson identifies three different policy types used from Lowi 
(1964): developmental, distributive, and allocational policy types. These policy types have 
different effects on the ratio. Peterson mainly focuses his analysis on developmental and 
redistributive policies. Developmental policies such as tax incentives to attract or retain major 
employers provide economic benefits to a city. Allocational policies are for example fire and 
police protection and this type of policy is considered neutral in their economic impact (Saiz, 
1999). Redistributive policies such as affordable housing programmes shift resources from 
middle- and upper-income to lower-income people and are harmful to a city’s economy Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
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(Basolo, 1999-1). Cities prefer support policies to keep companies and residents from leaving 
their community. That is why cities prefer developmental above redistributive programs. 
Because of the limited freedom of local politicians Peterson suggests that the federal 
government should take the responsibility for redistributive programs, like affordable housing 
programmes, since local governments will avoid this type of policy. (Basolo, 1999-2). 
 
Schneider (1989) adds to the models of Tiebout and Peterson and introduces a model about 
local markets for public goods. The main elements in this market are politicians, residents, 
firms and interest groups, bureaucrats, politicians, as well as the external limits. The external 
limits include economic conditions and its change, social conditions and its change, and 
intergovernmental limits. Schneider means with intergovernmental limits the autonomy of 
local governments and the limitations imposed from higher levels governments. Schneider 
says that the wide range of goods and services as well as the differences in taxes in local 
municipalities result in a local market for public goods. He identifies a local market with local 
businesses and residents on the demand side of the market and local elected officials and 
professionals bureaucrats on the supply side. Further, Schneider comments on the motives of 
city decision makers named by Peterson: “I especially rely on Peterson’s insight that it is the 
relationship between the above-average-income community member and the local benefit/cost 
ratio which informs the interests of local governments” (Schneider 1989: p.201). 
 
Schneider also agrees with Peterson’ view of local redistributive policy making. Schneider 
stresses that policies like affordable housing programs are redistributive and are there to help 
mostly lower-income people, but these individuals pay lower taxes. Higher-income 
households benefit little from these redistributive programs, but they are involved in a higher 
cost-to-benefit ratio than lower-income households (Basolo, 1999-2).  These higher-income 
may eventually choose to move to a community with lower cost-to-benefit ratio  
 
Downs (1957) made a public choice model of competition based on work on the role of 
political parties in a representative democracy. Down argues that politicians are motivated by 
power and they try to maximise their share of the popular vote. Down argues that if public 
opinion is on a left-right ideological axis, then the party leaders will be on the middle of the 
axis in order to win votes. Assumptions of Downs are that politicians are ‘power hungry’ and 
to get power is to win votes. Further, he assumed that politicians are so eager to win votes and Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
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they are little attached to policies, but will adopt the policies to win the election. The bigger 
the competition between the parties, the greater the chance that politicians will match their 
policies to the preference of the median voter at the centre of political spectrum. If there is no 
real competition, a party can pay less attention to the demands of the electorate, but try to 
maximise their power and adopting policies that please their own supporters (Boyne, 1998). 
 
Downs (1994) also comes with a view that assumes competition between communities. He 
emphasizes that cities must remain attractive and maintain a reasonable tax rate to attract 
residents and businesses. Redistributive policy is inconsistent with this goal regardless off the 
affluence level in the city. Down argues, “[. . . ]only wealthy communities can support major 
redistributive policies. And the residents of these localities have strong social and political 
motives to reject additional low-income residents and policies favourable to them” (p. 24).  
 
Like Schneider already stated, lower-income communities have a weak tax base, but typically 
a higher per capita cost for many public services. In these localities Downs argue, an increase 
in the tax rate to fund services gives a small return of revenues. Although these communities 
may elect officials that meets to their needs, the city decision makers will continue to use 
policies that economically benefits the community, such as subsidies to for-profit developers 
and discourage the attraction of additional lower-income people (Downs 1994). Downs 
concludes that the solution to intercity competition is an involvement of state or regional 
coordination and allocation of resources. 
 
Another public choice model based on competition is the model developed by Niskanen 
(1971). He made a model about the behaviour of public officials rather than politicians. 
Niskanen argues that city officials are motivated by a number of selfish objectives, like 
prestige, and that all of these interests are served by higher levels of public expenditure. In 
short, bureaucrats are budgets maximizers. Furthermore, they have the power to achieve this 
aim because they have a monopoly of information on the costs of service production, since 
they are the monopoly providers of public services. The consequence is that government 
expenditure is too high, and that services are inefficient and do not respond to the public 
demands. According to Niskanen, then, the wrong services are provided at the wrong price 
because of the monopolistic structure of public sector markets. A solution to this monopoly Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
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then would be competition, for example that the production of service may be done by a 
different organization (Boyne, 1998, p.8-9).   
 
As already stated by Peterson cities are not likely to give much importance to affordable 
housing policies. Citizens may perceive lower-income housing as having a negative effect on 
the community both socially and economically in the form of reduced property values. An 
example of this NIMBY phenomenon of citizens and city officials to the location of lower-
income housing is when suburban cities exclude high density residential development. High 
density residential housing is generally used for affordable housing than single-family 
development (Basolo, 1999-2).  This type of zoning when a local government exclude high 
density residential housing is called exclusionary zoning. Municipalities may use zoning 
restriction to exclude low-income families by raising the price of the general housing stock 
and decreasing the development of affordable housing. These restrictions may prescribe 
minimum lot size and floor space requirements. Large lots results in higher costs of owner-
occupied housing in suburban communities. This makes it hard for low- and moderate-income 
households to buy a house in these communities (Ihlanfeldt, 2004). 
 
A good example involving exclusionary zoning is the case of the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey, called Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel in 1975. 
The township used zoning ordinances that excluded low- and moderate income people. For 
example, it used practices that included lot size and floor space requirements and 
development limitations on apartment units with multiple bedrooms (Hennion, 2006) The 
Supreme Court decided that municipalities had to use their zoning powers in a way to provide 
an opportunity for the production of housing affordable to low- and moderate-income 
households. After this decision, lawsuits were filed against several municipalities. These 
lawsuits came from people that looked for affordable housing, and housing developers that 
tried to develop affordable housing. In the mean time, not many affordable housing was 
developed, so the state of New Jersey came with the Fair Housing Act that required 
municipalities to have a certain percentage of their housing stock affordable (Hall, 2003). 
 
2.2 Local autonomy 
There has been a lot of debating about how much power local governments have and should 
have. Frug (1980) argues that because of a general interpretation hostile to strong local Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
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government, American cities are more or less powerless and unable to solve the problems that 
they have. 
 
Briffault has a different opinion concerning local power. He says that it depends how power is 
defined. According to Briffault, “If power is defined as a legally enforceable right to existence 
and continuation, to control local resources and regulate local territory and to prevail in 
conflicts with higher levels of government, then local governments generally lack power. 
There is no right to local self-government.” (Brifault 1990-1) Yet, “If power refers to the 
actual arrangements for governance at the local level, then local governments possess 
considerable power.” (Briffault, 1990 -2). Briffault, unlike Frug, looks at all municipalities –
suburbs as well as cities. He says that most municipalities are far from powerless and that 
many have considerable autonomy over matters that concern to them. According to Briffault, 
especially suburban municipalities are far better off than central cities when it comes to 
having the power to do what they want to do. Briffault is also sceptical about the net benefits 
of so much local power and about the value of extending local autonomy. He argues, that 
localism reinforces territorial economic and social inequities and thus serves as an obstacle to 
securing social justice (Berman, 2003). 
 
Wolman and Smith stressed the importance of autonomy to local governments. They criticize  
what they call traditional literature, which defines autonomy as the “discretion local 
governments possess to act free from control by higher levels of government” (Wolman & 
Goldsmith, 1990: 24). They claim that the traditional treatments do not provide a rationale for 
the study of local politics. They ask themselves if local governments in urban areas have 
autonomy “in the sense that their presence and activities have impacts on anything important? 
Does urban politics matter?” (Wolman & Goldsmith, 1990: 3). According to them it indeed 
matters and they give a definition of local autonomy: “the freedom to exercise choice in local-
policy making and the capacity thereby to influence the well-being of local residents”. They 
assume that the greater the level of autonomy, the greater the ability to increase the well-being 
of residents in the urban area. In this context well-being is seen as welfare; as an income 
which permits individuals to purchase goods and services, to satisfy their desires. This will 
result in monetary and non-monetary welfare. 
 Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
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Goldsmith stressed that local autonomy is an important concept for understanding the local 
government, because autonomy is “at the heart of the very justification of most systems of 
elected local government“ (Goldsmith, 1997: p.229). Goldsmith argues that if local 
governments lack the ability to decide their policies and the supply of services, goods and tax 
rates, the local government will be an administrative arm of the state. And as a result the local 
elections will have little purpose (Goldsmith, 1997).  But on the other hand the idea that local 
governments having complete autonomy is unrealistic. Most local governments act in an 
environment which is more or less constrained and decentralized. Dependant on how 
constrained and decentralized a government system is, the autonomy of local governments 
can differ. Goldsmith claims that if political decision making is decentralized, each local unit 
‘can tailor its tax and service package to the preference of its citizenry’ (Goldsmith, 1990:31).  
As a result decentralized local governments will be closer to their citizens and so they are able 
to respond better to their demands to make the right policies which meet the public demands.  
 
Clark (1984) identifies two primary principles of local autonomy: the power of initiation and 
the power of immunity. Clark sees the power of initiation as the power of local governments 
to legislate and regulate the behaviour of their residents. The source of initiation powers is 
important for the principle of local autonomy. Local autonomy is reduced if for example 
states assign initiation powers to local governments. Local autonomy will then depend on the 
state legislation and this may result in a limited local autonomy. 
 
The power of immunity is “the power of localities to act without fear of the oversight 
authority of higher tiers of the state” (Clark, 1984: p.198). Localities can act “however they 
wish within the limits exposed by their initiative powers” (Clark, 1984: p.198). A good 
example of immunity would be local governments regulating land use, without an institution, 
like the state that is keeping an eye on them ( Clark, 1984, p.198). 
 
Clark combines the principles of local power to identify four ideal types of autonomy. 
The power of localities may be characterized by the following terms: 
  
 
Type 1: initiative and immunity 
Type 2: initiative and no immunity Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
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Type 3: no initiative and immunity 
Type 4: no initiative and no immunity 
 
Under type 1 local governments have both the capacity to initiate and are immune from 
higher levels of government. Under the opposite case (type 4) local governments have neither 
the power to initiate nor do they have any immunity from higher levels. Under Type 2, local 
governments have the power to initiate policies, but they are constrained in that everything 
they do is subject to oversight by higher levels of government. Under Type 3, local 
governments have little or no power to initiate, but are then immune from higher level 
oversight.  
 
Over the last decennia the power of localities has changed. In the 1980s, Reagan argued a 
decentralist policy, to reduce the power of the federal government relative to state and local 
governments by scaling down to reduce federal programs. He also supported the desirability 
of increasing the discretion of states and localities. Reagan challenged the notion that federal 
grants to state and local governments, in general, were necessary and useful (Berman, 2003).  
Many of these changes were explicitly designed to enhance the power of state government, 
not only with respect to the federal government, but also to local governments as well. But the 
overall reduction in grants meant that the resources available to local governments actually 
decreased, making it more difficult for them to support existing spending levels, thus in effect 
reducing their local autonomy (Goldsmith, 1995: p.244). 
 
 
2.3 Dillon’s rule 
Dillon’s rule (1911) is an important model of government powers and still is used in debates 
about the power relations between local and state government. To quote Dillon: “Municipal 
corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from, the 
legislature [….]They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants of the legislature.” (Dillon, 1911). 
He considers that local government is a ‘creature of the state’ and following a Supreme Court 
ruling of 1923, can have its powers and structures modified or withdrawn at the state’s 
discretion (Brown, 1993). Under Dillon’s rule local governments have only those powers 
“expressly granted” by state legislatures, powers necessary implied or incidental to the 
powers expressly granted. According to Dillon’s rule, local governments required to have 
legislative authority for everything they wish to do (Berman, 2003).  Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
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As a result of the model of Dillon, Clark’s local initiative powers and immunity powers are 
limited. The power of initiative is limited, because they can not do what they wish to do, their 
initiative powers by the state are assigned by the state. Also under Dillon’s rule local 
governments have no immunity, because state courts have the power to review, amend, and 
negate local decisions in areas like zoning (Clark, 1984). But many states have gone further 
than Dillon’s rule implied, giving their municipalities some form of home rule, this will be 
discussed later on.  Dillon’s rule have therefore lost some of its importance by states (Berman, 
2003). This has also to do with the fragmentation of the municipal system in the US. Such 
fragmentation can isolate communities, particularly the major central city, from other areas, 
leading to exclusionary zoning. Secondly, there may be internal constraints imposed upon the 
autonomy of localities, such as the celebrated tax and expenditure limitations enacted by some 
states and localities from the 1970s onwards. For example, by 1985, 31 states had placed a 
maximum on the tax rate which their localities could apply to the assessed value of property 
in their areas (Wolman and Goldsmith, 1992). 
  
Having said that, the political representation of cities and municipalities remains as strong as 
ever, even if the degree of influence may not be as great as exerted by state governors. In 
terms of the distinction between legal and political status, American local government would 
appear to have relatively high political status. As a result, local government in the US would 
thus have reasonable autonomy, even if its legal status is limited and relatively low. 
(Goldsmith, 1995, p.245). Tiebout’s model also assumes a relatively autonomous local 
government, comparable with type 2 of  Clark’s model. This contradicts with Clark’s opinion 
when he says that “the American reality of government autonomy seems much closer to 
absolutely no autonomy (type 4). Essentially, local governments are the bureaucratic 
extensions of state governments” (p.205).  
 
2.4  Home rule 
As already stated some American states have undermined Dillon’s rule by increasing local 
autonomy through home rule. The traditional and most common form of home rule gives 
local governments that qualify under state constitutional or statutory provisions the right to 
make decisions on their own and limiting the power of the state to intervene in the policies of Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
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the localities. There are two concepts of home rule provision: imperium in imperio and the 
National League of Cities model (NLC) (Berman, 2003).  
 
The imperio model was first introduced. Imperio creates a sphere of action labelled 
‘municipal affairs’. Within that sphere the municipality has initiative powers and is free to 
pass laws. Outside of that sphere it must obey and conform to the general laws of the state. 
Within the defined sphere of municipal affairs, imperio home rule gives local governments 
some initiative power and immunity from state regulation (Clark, 1984). However, courts had 
difficulties in finding the distinction between ‘municipal affairs’ and state affairs and these 
situations were most of the time in favour of the states. 
 
In 1953 the National League of Cities promoted a new model of home rule. The NLC model 
proposed that local governments can exercise every power, with the state legislature able to 
take any power back by passing laws. Imperio was thought to restrict local actions so 
narrowly that democracy at the local level became very limited (Clark, 1984). The NLC 
model on the other hand was to encourage the use of municipal power. However, courts have 
interpret the law in a way that restricts the municipal affairs to a small sphere of local affairs 
(Berman, 2003).  Although the home-rule was enacted, state legislatures have continued to 
legislate concerning local matters, often displacing local decision makers in the process. 
Home rule has failed to provide a shield against state influences on local power, because of 
the state courts “progressively considered view of what is a purely a local matter” (Briffault, 
1990). However, localities still try to rally behind the cry of ‘home rule’ to protect themselves 
from state actions that they feel are intruding on their sphere of activity. When it comes to 
money, state and local governments, like state governments and the federal government fight 
over access to tax resources and over funding responsibilities. Problems encountered by state 
and local officials in dealing with the federal government, mandates and the lack of assistance 
in meeting pressing financial needs, have also characterized state-local relation. 
 
Local officials have not only condemned state influences on local authority but also have tried 
to extract as much as they can in the form of resources from higher levels of government. 
They have strengthen their position towards the state with local home rule as a means of 
enhancing local discretion and of protecting local prerogatives and intergovernmental 
partnerships to extract resources from other governments.  
 Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
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2.5  State-local relationship 
State and local governments have several kinds of relationship and can fulfill different roles. 
This depends on how much local autonomy a municipality has and if a municipality is home 
rule community. Berman (2003) mentions four roles that local officals may exercise in a 
state-local relationship: 
1: agents of the state seeking to gain favour;   
2: representatives of autonomous governments; 
3: partners or co-governors with state officials; 
4: advocates who defend and pursue the special interests of their jurisdictions; 
 
According to Berman, these roles are not exclusive and local officials may play all four.  
Local officials see themselves as 2
nd en 3
rd role player by pursuing both autonomy and 
partnerships. State legislators have preferred to view local officials more negatively as agents 
of the state or as special interest representatives. Local officials as in the 2
nd role can be 
viewed as one of the forces of localism and as being part of an intergovernmental political 
system in which they promote and defend the interests of the local government which they 
present. Local governments try to defend these interests by surviving as an independent unit 
and securing the authority of their government. Conflicts between state and local level can 
occur when state legislatures are enacted. There are at least five areas of state-local conflicts 
that can be named (Wright, 1982): 
 
1.  taxation; 
2.  incorporation, annexation, and consolidation procedures; 
3.  regulatory authority in the fields of land use, health, building, traffic, and utilities; 
4.  organization and jurisdictions of local courts; and 
5.  conditions attached to the provision of major public services-education, public safety, 
sanitation, housing. 
 
The success of local officials and the organizations representing them to handle these 
conflicts depends on the skills they have and the political conditions. Sometimes local 
officials are on the offensive, trying to secure more authority of revenues, and sometimes they 
are on the defence, trying to protect what they have. Here, the financial well-being plays an 
important part (Wright, 1982). The quest for revenues takes them to the federal as well as the Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
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state governments, and often brings conflict with neighbouring local jurisdictions. Each area 
of the state wants its fair share of state spending and no area wants to subsidize spending 
programs going into other area. These areas may fight over for example who should pay for 
what services and how revenues should be allocated. Similar conflicts may occur between the 
same kind of local government, for example between municipalities. On the other hand, 
seeing themselves under economic stress or under severe financial constraints, local officials 
also think in terms of financially rewarding partnerships with every level of government. So 
for local governments building up partnerships is very important, though they have sought at 
the same time to minimize their loss of control or the degree of interference in their operations 
that the partnerships may bring. This important aspect of partnerships makes local officials, in 
stressing home rule and partnerships, inconsistent. While home rule calls for governmental 
separation and competition, the partnership idea places emphasis on the need for cooperation 
among local, state and federal governments, each of which is a unit in the same governing 
system. 
 
Sokolov (1980) argues that the behaviour of state officials towards local officials seems to 
best reflect the type of feelings that parents might have for their children. State actions such as 
coming to the rescue of local governments when they are suddenly faced with a financial 
emergency are a “natural outcome of a basic paternal relationship between the states and their 
local creatures” (Sokolov, 1998; p.180). For their part local officials complain about being 
treated as children. Given their childlike dependency on the state, some have theorized that 
local officials are likely to be anxious to avoid confrontations with state officials. On the other 
hand, others have suggested that local officials, like children have ways of getting what they 
want. Also, every now and then, local officials are going against the state, for example 
refusing to turn over taxes to the state and threatening to secede from the state.  
 
Discussing the parent-children relationship further, state legislators are generally against in 
giving more control to local governments. From their view they see local autonomy as an 
potential problem, but local governments see local autonomy as a good thing. As an Alabama 
state senator said of county governments, “I oppose any home-rule. We exist for checks and 
balances to keep county commissioners from doing anything unreasonable” (Berman, 2003). 
In some states, especially in the south, there is a long tradition of giving state legislators a 
great deal of control over legislation affecting local governments.  Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
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Not only state legislators are worried of the local autonomy, also other local actors, like 
business groups often oppose local home rule, because they think local governments will use 
their authority with home rule to impose more business tax and regulations which may affect 
profits.  When it comes to regulations, they find it easier to deal with a single state legislative 
body than with different local governments regulations. Local officials say on the other hand 
that there are important differences in local needs and conditions make different regulations 






The literature on public choice and local autonomy helps understanding what factors are 
motivating both state and local decisions with respect to affordable housing at the community 
level in Illinois.  
 
On the one hand, state officials of Illinois view the problem as a concern for the region as a 
whole and the consequences for the lack of affordable housing. Low and moderate income 
households having trouble finding affordable housing, because of high housing prices. 
Another concern of the state is, that local governments, as said in the theory, go for their own 
benefits and are mainly neglecting the affordable housing problem, because affordable 
housing does not yield as much tax revenue as expensive single-family housing does. Also 
state officials want to be competitive with other regions, so they need to keep low-moderate 
income households for low paid jobs. Therefore, the state has to intervene through a mandate 
to stimulate and press local governments for having more affordable housing in their 
community.  
 
On the other hand, at the local level, decision makers are constrained by high land prices and 
they want to attract high-income households and prefer single family housing development 
above affordable housing which consists mostly of high dense housing. Also decision makers 
on a local level have to be competitive with other municipalities in their region. They may 
fear that if there is a big development of affordable housing in their municipality, they may Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
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lose high income households and/or attract less high income households. Some communities 
may use their home-rule to keep of higher governments of intervening in their decision-
making process. Although this general aversion from local communities towards affordable 
housing, local communities may get more and more aware of the problem that households 
cannot find affordable housing. An important question if the Illinois Affordable Housing And 
Appeal Act is making this problem more aware for municipalities. Another aspect is if the 
state has enough authority, and than especially the state mandate, to enforce municipalities to 
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3. Affordable housing mandates 
 
In  this section  planning mandates  in the US will be discussed and its influence for plan-
making on a local level. First a definition will be given for mandates. Then the issue of 
unfunded mandates will be discussed as well as a theoretical framework on planning 
mandates will be given. This section ends with research on planning mandates and analysis 
from state mandates in Massachusetts, Connecticut and Rhode Island. 
 
3.1 Mandate defined 
 
There is not a universally accepted definition of a “mandate”.  This may cause problems, 
because when there is no common definition of a mandate it can result in difficulties for 
legislators and local officials to identify the issues a mandate can raise and how to response to 
it. Mandates can also be divided between state and federal mandates, both with their own 
requirements.  
 
Zimmerman (1987), a scholar who has written about mandates, defines a mandate as “a legal 
requirement that a local government must undertake a specified activity or provide a service 
meeting minimum state standards” (p.78). Some government officials and scholars define 
mandate narrowly as a mandatory requirement that says what local governments must do. A 
more broadly definition is also used, this definition includes conditional requirements that 
local governments must meet if they want to participate in optional programs or receive aid.  
 
Others expand the definition to include program and revenue-raising restrictions. Restrictions 
can have local fiscal impacts and may prevent local governments from acting as they choose. 
In 1994, in a study on federal mandates, the United States Advisory Commission on Inter- 
governmental Relations (1994) defined a mandate as a “statutory, regulatory, or judicial 
instruction that: 
1.  directs state or local governments to undertake a specific action or to perform an exis- 
ting function in a particular way;  
2.  imposes additional financial burdens on states and localities; or  
3.  reduces state and local revenue sources”. 
Duties that arise as a condition of federal assistance or from participation in a voluntary 
federal program are not seen as mandates. 
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A year later, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act was enacted, as a response to concerns of 
many local and state officials with regard to costs of federal mandate being placed upon them 
(UMRA, 1995). Local officials worried about the loss of local governmental authority, the 
lack of sufficient power to decide to generate local revenues, the lack of support of federal 
and state agencies, and, perhaps most of all, problems with unfunded mandates (Berman, 
2003). This act defines a mandate as any provision in legislation, statute, or regulation that 
would impose an enforceable duty on state, local, or tribal governments or the private sector, 
or that would reduce or eliminate the amount of funding authorized to cover the costs of 
existing mandates (UMRA, 1995).  
 
3.2 Role of state mandates on local planning 
Since the beginning of the 1970s, states have assumed increasing responsibility for planning 
issues that were formerly delegated to local government. This is also called the quiet 
revolution in land-use management (Dalton, Burby, 1994). Citizens and government became 
more conscious that economic growth had negative effects towards environmental issues and 
as a result concerns arose towards regional growth impacts, and social concerns, like 
affordable housing. This led to two forms of state intervention. The first state approach, 
described in detail by Kusler (1980), mentions direct state regulation and state mandates for 
local regulation of matters of particular state concern such as affordable housing. Advocates 
of this approach, including Kusler (1980) and Popper (1988) claimed that a combination of 
single-purpose planning laws can be as effective as more comprehensive state planning laws. 
The more comprehensive laws tend to be too diffuse in their objectives and difficult to 
enforce. The other form of state intervention is a growth management approach, based on 
planning and coordination. Growth management is an approach that arose in the 1970 and 
improved at the end of the 1980s. In the 1970’s it was mainly steered on environmental 
problems as a result of urban growth. The approach of 1980s and beginning of the 1990s 
focused more on comprehensive planning. Not only environmental problems had the 
attention, but also economic development, housing and infrastructure (Janssen-Jansen, 2001). 
State growth management uses mandates for local land-use planning. An important issue here 
is the policy consistency on both horizontal as well as vertical level of government (Burby 
and Dalton, 1994). 
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Source: Burby and Dalton (1994) 
 
Figure 3.1 shows a framework for state mandates on local planning. Burby and Dalton argue 
that states influence local development management through planning mandates, and also 
through other mandates that address specific development issues. State incentives, such as 
technical and financial assistance, can encourage the local commitment to make plans. 
Finally, a number of local situational factors affect local commitment, plans and development 
management efforts. These includes political support, development pressure, environmental 
constraints, and resources. The diagram  represents a top-down concept of state mandates that 
expect local governments will implement their policies. The diagram stresses the important 
role of the local planning system. Burby and Dalton argue that state mandates are not only of 
interest for the local planning agency and for local plans, but “also the local political 
environment and other contextual factors independently influence developments management 
programs” (p.446). They show how states try to influence localities and the means by which 
cities and counties adapt to these policies, react to their own situations, and initiate their own 
development management programs. To justify the goals of the state mandate it depends if the 
mandate has the ability to influence local planning activity. 
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A problem of mandates can be that they are often unfunded. Local governments then have to 
finance the mandate from their own local money. Mandates adding local costs to a 
municipality results mostly in a lot of complaints by local officials. As a result, local officials 
are on the defensive, trying to resist costly mandates (Berman, 2003). It also resulted in 
tensions between local and state level. To overcome these problem, federal and state 
governments have turned to collaborative planning and cooperative processes, which “aim 
[….]at enhancing local governments’ interest in and ability to achieve policy goals” (May, 
1995, p.91). In a cooperative process, higher levels of government offer incentives and 
technical assistance. May and Burby (1996) called such assistance catalytic controls and 
contrasted them with coercive controls, which “leave little room for manoeuvring and seek 
adherence to mandate goals through regulatory enforcements” (p.3).  
 
The last few decades a shift is noticeable in state-local planning relations between coercive 
and catalytic approaches. Early systems dealt with stopping undesirable actions, while many 
of the recently adopted systems have relied more on collaboration and cooperation between 
levels of government to encourage desired local actions. May (1995) argued nevertheless that 
there are only a few cases of cooperative policy approaches in state planning systems. The 
same could be said, however of coercive state planning. States use most of the time technical 
assistance and funds to promote their planning mandate on local governments. So the 
difference between coercive and catalytic planning have become in a sense fuzzy and the two 
different systems may not be that contradictory.  
 
3.3 Research on state mandates 
Deyle and Smith  (1998) did research on the compliance of the planning mandate in Florida. 
In 1985 the Florida’s planning mandatte was enacted, called the Local Government 
Comprehensive Planning Act. The mandate says that all cities and counties must prepare and 
adopt local comprehensive plans and have them approved by the state Department of 
Community Affairs (DCA). Florida’s state mandate is known as one of most coercive because 
of the great review powers of the state agency and the power to give heavy sanctions against 
non-complying communities (Deyle and Smith, 1998). 
 
Deyle and Smith did a analysis of compliance to the mandate on different categories which 
required a plan, for example a coastal infrastructure plan, beach and dune systems plan and an Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
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evacuation plan. They found that the compliance by local governments was variable within 
the different mandate categories. Evacuation plans got more compliance than coastal 
infrastructure plans, because protection of public safety through evacuation was given more 
importance. Another reason was that the state agency was under political pressure to make the 
reviews of the plan work. Combined with the limited time, the state agency judged some 
issues stronger than others and this may explain why some categories did not have a high 
compliance level as expected from a strong planning mandate. Deyle and Smith concluded to 
say that planning mandates clearly influence the decision of whether or not to prepare a plan 
and to influence the issues addressed in local plans. However, local officials in many Florida 
communities are unaware of, or paid little attention to the policies in their comprehensive 
plans on coastal storm hazards. So, in this case it can be said that local commitment to a plan 
is an important factor for the success of a mandate.  
 
Burby and Dalton (1994) did a study on hazard planning for 176 communities in five states 
that had different planning mandates. Local elected officials recognized that their 
communities could be vulnerable to natural catastrophes, so they supported the hazard 
planning mandate. However, because the location and timing of hazard events are uncertain, 
preparation and prevention efforts are easy to post-pone. Burby and Dalton found that state 
mandates wich use sanctions for non-compliance and offer state technical and financial 
assistance improve local plan quality, but also local legitimacy, like the support from the 
community’s residents and local government support are important factors. Local plan quality 
had a moderate effect on the number of municipal development tools (land use controls, site 
design requirements, building standards, and information) used to anticipate and prepare for 
future hazards. Local commitment for hazard planning by planners, local elected officials, 
residents, and developers had the greatest effect on the implementation of the plan.  
 
Pendall (2001) exercised a study about voluntary plans and involuntary plan mandates in the 
state of Maine. In 1988 Maine introduced a mandate that required municipal comprehensive 
plans, but replaced the mandate with a strong voluntary program in 1992, because of a drop in 
state funding and a growing resistance from the local level. Even though the mandate is since 
then voluntary, the state provides support to help local governments in making the plans for 
the mandate, including technical and financial assistance, and review of plans for consistency 
with plan mandates. Most of Maine’s local governments have developed and improved their Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
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comprehensive plans, despite the shift to voluntary planning, and the majority of local plans 
met the state’s planning goals. In this case, voluntary compliance resulted in more local plan 
adoption than did mandated compliance. When planning was mandated, plans were more 
likely to be submitted to the state, but no more likely to be adopted by local jurisdictions. A 
reason for the success of the voluntary plan is that the state offer professional support to make 
a plan. Pendall concluded that “the combination of incentives, assistance, and a qualified state 
agency with professional staff may produce positive results when compared to an unfunded 
mandate with only the lurking threat legal action to encourage municipal planning” (p.163).  
 
3.4 Affordable Housing Mandates in other states 
Beside Illinois, just a few other states have established affordable housing mandates. The 
housing mandates of Massachusetts, Connecticut and Rhode Island will be discussed here, 
because they use, as Illinois does, a statewide review board, where affected developers can 
appeal local zoning decisions. 
 
Massachusetts’ Comprehensive Permit and Zoning Appeals Act  
In 1969  the Massachusetts Comprehensive Permit and Zoning Appeals Act (Chapter 40B).  
was enacted (Massachusetts General Law, 1969). It is also known as the “Anti-Snob Zoning 
Law”, because of the promotion of affordable housing (Courchesne, 2003).  It resulted from 
the state’s recognition that there existed an “acute shortage of decent, safe and low and 
moderate cost housing” (HAC, 1969). Its purpose was to stimulate the production of 
affordable housing, especially in open exclusive suburban areas to housing for people of low 
and moderate incomes. The act requires that ten percent of the housing stock within all 
Massachusetts municipalities becomes affordable. At least 25 percent of the housing what is 
planned to be developed must be affordable to households that earn no more than 80 percent 
of the area median income, and affordability restrictions must be maintained for at least 15 
years. To qualify for Chapter 40B, a development project must first be approved by the state. 
They must be part of a subsidized project built or operated by a public agency, non-profit or 
limited dividend organization. (Chapa, 2001). 
 
Chapter 40B consists of a comprehensive permit component and an appeals component. The 
comprehensive permit component allows organizations that wish to build low- or moderate-
income housing to submit a single building application to the local Zoning Board of Appeals Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
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(ZBA) instead of the several applications to different boards that are normally necessary. This 
is for developers much easier and gives them an incentive to built. Chapter 40B directs the 
ZBA to notify the other boards about the application, to hold a public hearing on the 
application, and to grant or deny the application within forty days of the public hearing.  If the 
ZBA grants the application, a comprehensive permit (CP) will be given.  If the ZBA denies 
the application or grants it with conditions that make the project “uneconomic,”  the applicant 
may appeal the decision with the Housing Appeals Committee (HAC) (Massachusetts 
General Law, 1969). So far, Chapter 40B has had reasonable impact in Massachusetts’ 
affordable housing supply. From 1969 until 2006 more than 50,000 units have been build 
under the act, from which 23.000 are affordable. These 23.000 affordable units were in some 
cases part of mixed income developments, this explains the other units. In 2006, 47 
municipalities out of 351 have reached the 10 percent of affordable housing required by the 
act, up from 23 municipalities in 1997  (Chapa, 2006).  Further, in the last three years before 
2006, 30% of all housing production in Massachusetts was directly attributable to Chapter 
40B (Chapa, 2006). Although the success of last years, housing advocates argue the law still 
is an absolute necessity in Massachusetts, where housing prices have increased the last two 
decades at a similar pace to that of New York and San Francisco. The suburbs have built 
mostly expensive, large-lot, single-family. As a result, several communities, far from having 
10 percent affordable housing, have barely one percent (Flint, 2004). 
 
The last couple of years local officials are unhappy with Chapter 40 B saying that they have 
no control over where development goes and putting a big constrain on schools and municipal 
services (Flint, 2004). From local officials there came support to weaken or cancel the 
mandate and therefore, in 2003, then Governor Mitt Romney established a taskforce on 
Chapter 40B. The taskforce recommended to keep the law but to give municipalities more 
space from multiple project proposals if they show progress toward increasing affordability 
within a year. It was also decided that municipalities get credit if they produce a plan showing 
how they will meet affordable housing goals over several years and they can get technical 
assistance for the preparation of the required plans  (MHP, 2003). 
 
Rhode Island 
Rhode Island’s Low and Moderate Income Housing Act (the “RI Act”) has its influence by 
the Massachusetts Chapter 40B. The Rhode Island Act was enacted in 1991, and resulted Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
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from Rhode Island’s recognition that “there exists an acute shortage of affordable, accessible, 
safe, and sanitary housing” and “that it is necessary that each city and town provide 
opportunities for the establishment of low and moderate income housing.” (Rhode Island 
General Assembly, 1991).  The RI Act seeks to create “housing opportunities for low and 
moderate income individuals” in every municipality, to rehabilitate existing housing, and to 
assimilate “low and moderate income housing into existing developments and 
neighbourhoods” (Rhode Island General Assembly, 1991).  
 
Like Chapter 40B, the RI Act consists of both a comprehensive permit component and an 
appeals component (Rhode Island General Assembly, 2004).  The comprehensive permit 
component requires an affordable housing developer to built 25 percent of the units for 
affordable housing. The developer needs to submit a single housing application to the local 
review board (LRB) in instead of separate applications to multiple boards that are normally 
necessary. After that, the application is reviewed for completeness to comply. Once the 
application is judged as complete, the RI Act requires the LRB to notify other interested 
boards about the application, to hold a public hearing on the application, and to render a 
decision granting or denying the application within 95 days of the issuance of a certificate of 
completeness for minor projects and within 120 days of the issuance of a certificate of 
completeness for major projects. If the LRB grants the application, a comprenhensive permit 
is issued. If the LRB denies the application or grants it with conditions that make the project 
“infeasible,” the applicant may file an appeal with the State Housing Appeals Board (HAB) 
(Rhode Island General Assembly, 2004).   
 
The precise effect of the RI Act on Rhode Island’s affordable housing supply is unknown. 
However, the affordable housing supply increased by 19 percent in the ten years after the RI 
Act’s was enacted. This is about 5500 affordable housing units (Devitt, 2005). 
 
Connecticut 
Connecticut’s Affordable Housing Land Use Appeals Procedure (Section 8-30g) differs 
slightly from the Massachusetts and Rhode Island procedures. It was enacted in 1989 in 
response to Connecticut’s concern over its affordable housing crisis. The purpose of Section 
8-30g was to encourage towns to participate in voluntary state inclusionary housing initiatives 
and to encourage local land use commissions to consider affordable housing needs Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
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(Connecticut General Assemby, 1991). Unlike the Massachusetts and Rhode Island 
procedures, Section 8-30g does not have a comprehensive permit component. Instead, it may 
be used by any person filing an affordable housing application with any housing commission. 
It requires that the person submits an affordability plan with the application. If the 
commission grants the application, a permit is issued to the developer. If the commission 
denies the application, or grants it with conditions that have a “substantial adverse impact on 
the viability of the affordable housing development,” the applicant may modify and resubmit 
the application or appeal the commission’s decision (Connecticut General Assemby, 1991) . 
Section 8-30g is responsible for the construction of some affordable housing in Connecticut.  
 
The Appeals Act has been controversial. Municipalities have objected that the statute 
interferes in their home rule authority. Planners have feared that builders could forcel 
communities into accepting development proposals by threatening to file an affordable 
housing proposal if the first proposal were rejected.  
 
Of the total number of Section 8-30g units built, two-thirds were approved or resulted from 
negotiations between the developers and municipalities. The other one-third resulted from 
court decisions overturning the commission’s denial of a project. (Jennifer Devitt, 2005). 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
The research and literature on planning mandates above show mixed results. Planning 
mandates that get implemented with support from state sponsoring agencies with for example 
technical assistance, funding and incentives receive more local commitment from residents, 
officials and professional planners than unfunded mandates. That is why a state has to provide 
incentives and funds to encourage local action. When local officials believe in the goals, it is 
more likely that there will be more local commitment to a plan and that the mandate has more 
chances to be successful.  
 
Unfunded mandates are often not popular by local governments, this can result in resistance 
to the mandate. Clearly and narrowly focused mandates are more likely to succeed than broad 
and inclusive policies. Lately growth management receives more attention by government 
levels. Important here is cooperation and collaboration between state and local level to 
accommodate growth in a good way. The development of affordable housing could fit well in 
this approach, when more houses are developed on one lot, which makes it more affordable.  Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
   
 
  
   34 
  
 
When looking to the cases of Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Connecticut, it can be said that 
the mandates had and have a substantial effect on the development of affordable housing. In 
addition, local governments have gotten more aware of the affordable housing problem. 
Massachusetts has a strong mandate which resulted in a substantial development of affordable 
housing, especially in the last couple of years. It encouraged municipalities to make an 
affordable housing plan (Chapa, 2006). Under the Massachusetts Act, the Housing Appeals 
Committee puts a strong push towards municipalities, because if a developer appeals to the 
Housing Appeals Committee, the developer has a good chance of winning it. So communities 
know they better to take action to facilitate affordable housing. However for all cases counts 
that still a lot has to been done when looking for example to the problem of increasing 
housing prices and the local commitment to a mandate.   
 
In the next section the case of the Illinois Housing Planning and Appeal Act will be discussed. 
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4. Case study: Home rule municipalities under the Illinois Affordable 
Housing Planning and Appeal Act 
 
This section will discuss the Illinois Affordable Housing and Planning Act and how suburban 
municipalities in Chicago Metropolitan Area are dealing with this act. The focus is especially 
on home rule municipalities, because they have a certain degree of autonomy and it could be 
interesting to see how they interpret the act. Among these home rule communities, Highland 
Park is chosen, because it is an active community with affordable housing.  This section will 
start with affordable housing problem in the Chicago Metropolitan and thereafter with 
outlining the act. Then the issues of home rule municipalities will be discussed, including a 
case study about Highland Park. 
 
4.1 Affordable housing problem in the Chicago Metropolitan Area 
Many towns and cities in Illinois, like in other states around the country, are facing shortages 
of affordable housing. This shortage can hinder economic development, increase traffic 
congestion, and limit opportunities for hard-working residents and their children. These 
challenges have resulted in consequences for homeowners, renters, communities, and the state 
as a whole (IHDA, 2005). Over 730,000 families, 25% of all the families in the Chicago 
Metropolitan Area, have financial problems, because they pay more than 30% of  their 
income for housing (Chicago Metropolis 2020). It is estimated that an additional 140,000 
families will face the same problem by 2030 due to a lack of affordable housing. By 2030, the 
regional population is expected to increase 24%, from 8,1 million in 2000 to 10 million.   
 
Reasons for shortage of affordable housing in Chicago Metropolitan Area 
Several reasons can be given for the lack of affordable housing.  First, rents have increased 
rapidly. The monthly median rent increased to $935 dollar for a two-bedroom apartment in 
2006. To afford this rent a household needs to earn $37,400 per year, the equivalent of more 
than 2 minimum wage jobs (Paywizard, 2008). Also home owners have more problems 
financing their home. Home foreclosures in the Chicago Metropolitan Area have increased 
rapidly with 55% between 2005 and 2006, a total of 72,000. The first nine months of 2007 
have reached a 16% increase from the same period in 2006 (Realtytrac, 2007).  
 
Second, local barriers also contribute to the shortage of affordable housing. Over the last 
decades the spatial organization and location of suburban municipalities have developed into Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
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a geographic segmentation and clustering of housing by value. Municipalities, like in the 
Chicago Metropolitan Area that contain mainly expensive housing are mostly located away 
from municipalities with mainly inexpensive housing. This is intensified by communities that 
are adopting zoning regulations that restrict parcel size and dwelling type (Hoch, 2005). 
These barriers have excluded low- and moderate income households. The result is that the 
region is one of the most economically and racially segregated regions in the nation (Brunick 
& Patton, 2003). Affordable housing advocating agencies like BPI believe that municipal 
plans and regulations can and should be used to increase the provision of affordable housing 
(Brunick, Patton, 2003). According to them, municipalities made plans and used regulations 
in the past that increased the provision of expensive housing. In other words, municipalities 
play an active role shaping the geographic location of housing development in the regional 
housing market. The resulting economic hierarchy of suburban municipalities has produced 
unexpected consequences. Young adults starting a new household cannot afford to live near 
parents in the old neighbourhood. Local government employees, like fire fighters, nurses, 
policemen cannot afford to live in the community where they work (see table 4.1).  
 








Fire Fighter and 
Nursing Aide 
$81,947 $272,728  $655,000 
Registered Nurse 
and Bank Teller 








$74,509 $247,959  $655,000 
Receptionist and 
Security Guard 
$46,914 $156,073  $655,000 
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Source: Interfaith Housing Center, 2007 
 
This phenomenon is called the jobs/housing mismatch (BPI, 2007). Table 4.1 shows 
information of a wealthy suburb in the Chicago Metropolitan Area. called Northbrook. The 
prices of the affordable homes which the workforce can afford differs greatly from the median 
home price in Northbrook. For them is it very difficult to find a decent house they can afford. 
As a consequence of the high housing prices in the municipality, they have to find a house, 
mostly far from where they work (Clarke, 2007).  
 
Jobs/housing mismatch 
The phenomenon of jobs/housing mismatch has its origin after World War II when suburbs 
were growing and with an increasing mobility. This resulted in a decentralisation of 
metropolitan employment and so this meant that workers no longer needed to live near a 
single central business district. This undermined the classic urban-economics conception of 
jobs in a central city surrounded by successively higher-income rings of suburbs. Once jobs 
suburbanised, low-income workers who had formerly resided close to central cities to 
conserve on commuting costs now had to find jobs in the suburbs. Indeed, for those poor 
without automobiles or confined by racial prejudice to the central cities, the “spatial 
mismatch’ between jobs and homes became a real concern (Fischel, 2004). These will result 
in increasing traffic in the region and increasing travel costs for individual households. 
Ultimately these traffic costs will have consequences for the economic position of the 
Chicago Metropolitan Area in comparison with for example the Sunbelt area. Nowadays, 
regional commuting times are the second longest in the nation (Chicago Metropolis 2020).  
 
Suburban residential inequality 
Besides workers having difficulties finding affordable housing, seniors are being priced out of 
the communities where they grew up and raised their own children. The range of dwelling 
prices within many suburban municipalities shrinks increasing the differences among 
municipalities. This has led to suburban residential inequality. 
 
There are more factors that can be named as a possible cause for suburban residential 
inequality. In the 1960s farmland in developing suburbs were often initially zoned for three-
acre lots as a temporarily “holding zone” (Fischel, 2004). Land-owners and civic leaders Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
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expected such land to be rezoned to smaller lots and higher density as development pressure 
arose. The new development was not much feared by existing home-owners because it was 
expected to be more of the same type of homes that were already there. But as jobs 
decentralized, the factors that had established high-income suburbs, like the greater pull for 
the rich of cheaper suburban land compared with their larger suburban travel costs, started to 
diminish. From the 1970s the community’s quality of life in US suburbs became an important 
determinant of home values. The model of Tiebout (1956) in which public services are 
determined by the householders ‘voting with their feet’ in suburbs became an important issue 
here with home values and location decisions. Home-owners kept an eye on zoning changes 
that might affect that quality of life. The three-acre minimum lot sizes and farmland that had 
formerly been regarded as ‘holding’ zones stayed as an permanent area that kept the poor and 
higher-density development from wealthy suburbs.  
 
Besides jobs decentralization, segregation by race is and was an issue, although segregation 
through racial zoning was almost never tolerated by the courts. Zoning could, however, be 
used to reduce potential contact between races, or between high- and low-income, through 
ordinances that required large lots and single family homes in residential districts. But 
exclusion is not only happening by race, it is more about income and class (Fischel, 2004). 
These developments have produced housing markets in the U.S. that are segmented and 
regions with similar housing values are clustered together. For example, a residential 
subdivision containing $500,000 homes will more likely adjoin a community containing 
$300,000 priced homes than one with $100,000 priced homes. Local governments can even 
increase these inequality by using zoning ordinances to exclude affordable housing 
developments and to encourage single-family homes on large lots (Hoch, 2005).  This is 
called exclusionary zoning. In a survey of BPI in 2002 among developers and homebuilders 
in the North East Illinois Region about the impact of local zoning and permit requirements on 
the development of affordable housing, it appeared that 9 out of 10 developers believed there 
are local regulatory barriers that impede the development of affordable housing,  particularly 
the length of the approval process, large minimum lot size requirements and lower density 
requirements (Brunick & Patton, 2003).  
 
All these issues have led to the state and advocating agencies like BPI taking action by 
creating the Affordable Housing Planning and Appeal Act. This act is made to provide new Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
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ways to remove inefficient barriers in the housing market and facilitate the creation of 
affordable housing.  
 
 
4.2 Illinois Affordable Housing Planning and Appeal Act 
 
In 2003, the planning mandate for affordable housing, called the Illinois Affordable Housing 
Planning and Appeal Act (IAHPA), was enacted by the state of Illinois. On January 1 2004, 
the act came into effect. The purpose of the Act is “to encourage municipalities and counties 
to incorporate sufficient affordable housing into their communities” (Illinois General 
Assembly, 2004: p.1). The act defines affordable housing as housing that costs no more than 
30% of a low- and moderate income family’s gross earnings. Rental units must be affordable 
to households with incomes of 60% of area median household income and owner-occupied 
units must be affordable to households with incomes of 80% of area median household 
income (Illinois General Assembly, 2004). The act required all counties and municipalities 
with insufficient affordable housing to adopt an affordable housing plan. If less than 10% of 
the housing stock of an Illinois municipality was affordable, the IAHPA required that the 
local government had to make and adopt an affordable housing plan by April 2005. 
Municipalities with more 10% affordable housing of their total housing stock are not 
requested to make an affordable housing plan. The act does not apply for jurisdictions with 
1,000 or fewer inhabitants (Illinois General Assembly). 
 
The State of Illinois has no statewide agency focusing on either planning or housing. The 
responsibility for implementing the new laws was given to the state housing finance agency, 
named the Illinois Housing Development Authority (IHDA), without any funding. IHDA 
identified the noncompliant municipalities and requested them to make an affordable housing 
plan and provided workshops describing the law and possible affordable housing policies, 
programs, and regulations to help a municipality in facilitating affordable housing 
development (Quick, 2007). 
 
In August 2004, the Illinois Housing Development Authority (IHDA) identified 49 
communities that do not have enough affordable housing to pass the 10-percent compliance 
level. Most of these suburban communities consist mainly of high value single family 
dwellings and are situated in the north and west side of the Chicago Metropolitan Region. Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
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This is clear to see in figure 4.1 and 4.2 where median house values are the highest in the west 
and north side of the Chicago Metropolitan Region. The 49 municipalities had until April 
2005 to make and adopt an affordable housing compliance plan. By 2007, Deerfield, 
Lincolnwood and Park Ridge had not yet completed their plan (Clarke, 2007). 
 
Figure 4.1 Median House Values in Chicago Metropolitan Region 
 
Source: University of Illinois, 2005 
 
The IAHPA identified the following requirements needed for the affordable housing plan 
which needed to be adopted by the non-compliant municipalities: 
 
1.  Count the number of units needed to meet the 10% requirement. 
2.  Identify land and structure available for development as affordable housing. 
3.  Identify and adopt incentives to attract affordable housing development, 
4.  Adopt one of the following goals: 
  Make 15% of new housing development affordable; 
  Achieve a 3% increase in total affordable housing units; or Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
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  Provide enough affordable housing to reach 10% of total units. 
 
Local governments and residential developers may appeal the IHDA’s determination that a 
county or municipality does or does not comply with the IAHPA. Since January 2006, 
developers seeking to build affordable housing who claim to have been unfairly denied by 
local government ordinances or regulations may also appeal to a State Housing Appeals 
Board. Starting in 2009, the Appeals Board is empowered to review cases concerning 
affordable housing developments. (University of Illinois, 2004). Communities with 10% or 
more affordable housing or communities that have submit a plan are not subject to the 
authority of the Appeals Board. Another aspect is that the developer must bear the burden of 
successfully proving to the State Housing Appeals Board that the development was denied 
because of its affordable component (IHDA, 2004).  To be eligible to make use of the appeals 
process, developers must include 20% affordable housing in their proposed development. 
 
In 2005, the law was improved.   To encourage development of creative solutions to the 
affordable housing crisis, the law now allows communities to work together with other 
municipalities or counties with less than 25% affordable housing and within ten miles of their 
corporate boundaries to facilitate affordable housing. For example, one municipality can 
provide land and another funding to develop affordable housing. This is a way to reach the 
10% threshold, and then the municipalities are able to divide the credit for the units produced 
through an intergovernmental agreement (BPI, 2007).  
 
4.3 Compliance to IAHPA from home rule municipalities  
 
Fourteen of the 49 non-exempt municipalities determined in August of 2004 are home rule 
municipalities (IHDA, 2005). IHDA (2005) says that this law ‘does not specifically exempt 
home rule municipalities from coverage under this law, and that neither House nor Senate bill 
sponsors or members requested a Home Rule Note to make such a further determination 
during the process of this law or its later amendment being approved by the Illinois General 
Assembly (p.3).”  Some home rule suburban municipalities among the 49 municipalities have 
a different opinion and argue that the law does not apply to them. First a brief history of home 
rule in Illinois will be given as well as conflicts that have occurred between home rule units 
and other level of governments 
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History of home rule in Illinois 
In 1970 the state of Illinois adopted a home rule provision as part of its constitution. Home 
rule provision applies only for municipalities with a population of more than 25,000 
inhabitants. Other municipalities below 25,000 inhabitants may elect by referenda to become 
home rule units. The grants of power is contained in Section 6 (Illinois Constitution, 1970): 
“Except as limited by this Section, a home rule unit may exercise any power and perform any 
function pertaining to its governments and affairs including but not limited to, the power to 
regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals and welfare; to license; to tax; 
and to incur debt.” This includes the power to enact zoning restrictions, and for example 
exclusionary zoning. Home rule units have no power to regulate national, state or regional 
affairs. 
 









Source: Banovetz, 2000                                                                         
 
Conflicts have occurred with home rule provision between governments. In the court case 
City of Evanston v. County of Cook in Illinois the relationship between county and municipal 
home rule about zoning and licensing ordinance was discussed (Zarlengo, 2004). Because 
there is an opportunity for direct conflict between county and municipal zoning and licensing 
ordinances, Section 6(c) does apply, which says that “when a home rule county and municipal 
ordinance conflict, "the municipal ordinance will prevail within its jurisdiction and the 
municipal ordinance prevails (Illinois Constitution, 1970). The court’s use of the word 
“opportunity”, however, leaves the door open for the home rule county and home rule 
municipality to zone in the same field, as long as the ordinances do not conflict directly. Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
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Finally, the court decided that the county ordinance could override the municipal ordinance, 
because the City of Evanston did not clarify their ordinances enough. 
 
Conflict of home rule communities versus Affordable Housing Planning and Appeal Act 
As already mentioned earlier, the Affordable Housing Planning and Appeal Act states that it 
does not exempt home rule communities. However, the home rule provision in Illinois could 
result in claims by local officials arguing that their municipality does not apply to the act. 
There already have been local officials claiming this (Hoch, 2007). An example is the suburb 
Wilmette, a wealthy North-shore municipality, which mentions in their affordable housing 
plan that they invite moderate-income households to their community, but they also defend 
home rule. Their affordable housing plan mentions that the state of Illinois has no authority to 
impose a planning mandate on Wilmette, since they are home rule. Further they oppose the 
mandate, saying that their village already meets the 10% standard. This contradicts with 
IHDA findings that Wilmette has 5,50% affordable housing of their total housing stock. 
Although this defensive attitude towards the act, the plan stresses that  the “crux of this Plan is 
the Village’s ongoing commitment to a proactive, but reasoned approach to providing 
additional affordable housing (Village of Wilmette, 2004).”   
 
Another wealthy home rule suburb on the North-shore, called Northbrook, also defends home 
rule. They adopted an affordable housing plan where they stated: “the Act did not preempt 
home rule authority, it is our opinion that the Act does not apply to the Village, a home rule 
municipality (Village of Northbrook, 2005).” They argue that the Act does not include an 
explicit statement that it intends to restrict the authority of home rule municipalities. Further 
they argue that the Act misses a statement that it is a purely statewide interest. The third 
argument they use is that the Act does not specifically limit concurrent exercise of a local 
government or specifically declare the State’s exercise to be exclusive. However, having 
named these arguments, the Village of Northbrook stresses that it is important to provide 
opportunities for affordable housing. Also they note that without substantial subsidies from 
the state, it will be difficult to facilitate affordable housing.  
 
Among the fourteen home rule communities, three suburban municipalities in the Chicago 
Metropolitan Area, called Deerfield, Lincolnwood and Park Ridge failed to make a plan 
(Clarke, 2007). Officials from these municipalities argue that because they are a home rule Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
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community, the act exempts them from the act (IHDA, 2004). In 2004 the Metropolitan 
Mayor Caucus (MMC), an association of municipalities in the Chicago Metropolitan Area 
said, based on the Illinois Constitution and Illinois Supreme Court cases, that the Affordable 
Housing Planning and Appeal Act does not apply to home rule units of local government  
(Friedman, 2004).  
 
The association gives three arguments for their statement. At first MMC claims that the act 
does not contain any explicit home rule preemption to restrict the powers of home rule 
municipalities. Second, like the Village of Northbrook also stated, they argue that the Act 
does not contain any express statement that affordable housing is purely a statewide interest.  
As already stated home rule municipalities have an authority for their local zoning. But 
Illinois courts can limit these zoning by issues of national and statewide concerns. Under the 
“statewide concern”, a home rule unit may use its power to regulate problems that are local in 
nature, but not those which are statewide or national concerns. The question than arises if 
housing is a local concern or a statewide concern. In many ways, zoning housing development 
is mainly a local issue. Courts will likely resist extending the statewide concern issue to 
something as pedestrian as housing development, fearing that making it too broad would 
result in limiting home rule authority to something very small. On the other hand, supporters 
of the Illinois Act will name problems like job/housing mismatch and increasing traffic and 
limited mass transit between central cities and suburbs.  These problems make it not only a 
local concern, but also and moreover a statewide concern. Third, Article VII, Sec. 6(i) of the 
Illinois Constitution mentions that home rule units may exercise powers and perform 
functions concurrently with the state, “to the extent that the General Assembly by law does 
not specifically limit the concurrent exercise or specifically declare the State's exercise to be 
exclusive” (Illinois Constitution, 1970). The Affordable Housing Act does not specifically 
limit local governments’ concurrent exercise or specifically declare the State’s exercise to be 
exclusive. To the contrary, as noted above, the Affordable Housing Act calls for local exercise 
of authority and discretion in establishing plans and implementing regulations relating to 
affordable housing.  
 
The arguments mentioned above show a clear defensive attitude towards the act. City officials 
of the home rule communities are aware of their autonomy and some use their home rule Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
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power to be exempt from the act. An underlying argument is the avoidance of the act, because 
this may result in a loss of residents (Basolo, 1999-1). 
 
Among residents of wealthy suburbs on the North Shore like Wilmette also exists opposition 
of the act by saying, it took more than one hundred years through vision and investment by 
city officials to preserve their “wonderful open space and forest-like atmosphere” (Collins, 
2004)  They are afraid that high-dense affordable housing will damage the character of their 
village. Schechter (2004) mentiones the character of North Shore Communities is 
“synonymous with affluence, close mindedness and whiteness”. This character was created 
deliberately through now-illegal covenants that restricted the sale and rental of housing by 
race and religion. The pressure from residents can result in city officials deciding to do the 
minimum required by the act or to not comply at all. Further, city officials claim their local 
autonomy is interfered by an unfunded state mandate, that is why suburbs like Wilmette use 
home rule as an argument to oppose the act (Hoch, 2007-1). Also there are stereotypes among 
residents that affordable housing will have a negative impact on property values (Clarke, 
2007). Research has shown that this is not the case. A 1999 study by the Innovative Housing 
Institute examined every real estate transaction from 1992-1996 in 14 communities of 
Montgomery County, Maryland, and Fairfax County, Virginia. The research showed that in 
both counties, no difference in price behaviour between market-rate homes located within 500 
feet of a subsidized or affordable home and those market-rate homes farther away. It also 
found no difference in price behaviour between market-rate homes adjacent to affordable 
homes and those farther away (Siegel, 1999).  
 
In the next section the city of Highland Park will be discussed, which is a home rule suburban 
community being actively involved in affordable housing. 
 
4.4 The case of Highland Park 
 
It was 1869 when the town of Highland Park was incorporated in Lake County. The 
population at that time was about 500. In 2000, the United States census calculated Highland 
Park’s population to be 31,365 residents. The city is situated 23 miles north of Chicago. It is 
located along Lake Michigan (see figure 4.3).          
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Highland Park distinguishes itself from other North Shore suburbs through a unique history of 
religious pluralism and deliberate tolerance. The Highland Park promoters and residents 
marketed the area as distinct from rival suburbs as an “inclusive” area to attract new residents 
(Highland Park, 2003). This history of “inclusiveness” is reflected in 1874 by the Highland 
Park Building Company’s promise of “great harmony” among residents, the absence  of 
restrictive covenants, and the presence of an income mix of residents living in a diverse 






















Beginning in 1970, there was a  concern that the diversity of housing and residents was 
decreasing. This concern resulted in the formation of the Highland Park Housing Com- 
mission (HPHC) in 1973.  Since the establishment  of this commission, there  has  been  some 
development of affordable or subsidized housing units in the city. Despite these efforts of the Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
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HPHC, the conditions first recognized in 1970 have continued to intensify and threaten to 
change the Highland Park character as an inclusive place. 
 
In this last 15 years, Highland Park has become an increasingly attractive place to live. This 
has resulted in higher home prices and the conversion or demolition of many affordable 
housing units to make place for larger and/or more expensive homes. Between 1993 and 
1999, the median sales price of a home increased 17.2%, from $238,750 to $332,000. A 
minimum annual household income of $108,000 is needed to afford the median 1999 home 
price of $332,000. 
 
Higher home prices resulted in that lower-income families and long-time residents on fixed 
incomes had to leave the area. The decrease in affordable units is also affecting the ability of 
local businesses to hire and keep employees, especially as the labour market remains tight and 
unemployment remains low. 
 
Highland Park and affordable housing 
The developments of higher home prices resulted in 1999 in making an affordable housing 
plan which was finished in 2001 and adopted by the City Council. In 2003 the plan had an 
data update. The Highland Park plan mentions inadequate sites, high land values, and public 
fears, but addresses each challenge with detailed program and policy actions and describing 
steps to make affordable housing feasible (Highland Park, 2003).  
 
The City of Highland Park made several strategies to promote affordable housing. One 
strategy is in order to promote affordable single-family homeownership, the preservation of 
existing homes. This strategy would help to maintain the neighbourhood character and to 
prevent the demolition of houses.  The demolition had led to a reduction in the diversity of the 
city’s housing stock and a decrease in the availability of affordable housing options within 
Highland Park.  To decrease the demolition the city introduced  a demolition tax. The tax is 
imposed on all residential demolitions and the tax is $10,000 for single family homes. For 
multi-unit buildings, the tax is either $10,000 or $3,000 per unit.   The revenues from the tear 
down tax would be used to help fund new initiatives to address the community’s affordable 
housing needs (Highland Park, 2003). 
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Another strategy for affordable ownership options are the promotion of town houses and 
condominium developments which are more high-dense and so the high land costs can be 
spread over a larger number of units. Also rental housing is an important housing option. For 
the many of housing this is the only housing option, because they do not have the income to 
buy a house and support a mortgage. 
 
Highland Park faces two major constraints that make it difficult to construct affordable 
housing in the municipality: little vacant land and rapidly increasing property values. These 
factors are related, as a smaller supply in housing leads to an increased demand, subsequently 
raising home prices and rents. A strategy to address the scarcity of developable land and land 
value appreciation is a land trust strategy. The idea is to purchase the most affordable 
properties available, limit the appreciation of the land by holding it in trust, and selling or 
leasing only the structures that sit on the properties. Through this land trust strategy, no 
additional land is required to build new housing, and affordability is preserved. The only 
problem is that enough funds are required to purchase the affordable properties (Highland 
Park, 2003).  
 
Further in the plan some incentives for affordable housing are mentioned. One of these is 
inclusionary zoning. It is a mechanism that requires developers to include a certain percentage 
of affordable units in residential developments they want to develop. The principle objective 
of inclusionary zoning is not only to increase the supply of affordable housing, but to do so in 
a way that fosters greater economic and racial residential integration (Calavita et al, 1997). 
With the passing of an inclusionary zoning ordinance in 2003,  Highland Park became the 
first municipality in the region to use this tool that links the development of market-rate 
residential units with a percentage of affordable units (Brunick & Patton, 2003).  
 
As today, the plan has resulted in the developed in rental housing in four affordable 
developments managed by the HPHC. In 2001 a private non-profit developer built 60 condos, 
12 of them affordable rental units as part of inclusionary zoning development. The city owns 
those 12 units and the non profit organization, called Housing Opportunity Development 
Corporation (HODC), manages them. The other 48 units are affordable and owned by private 
households. By 2007, 7,6 % of the housing stock of Highland Park is considered as 
affordable. Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
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Approach towards Illinois Affordable Housing Planning And Appeal Act 
As already said the Highland Park Affordable Housing Plan was adopted two years before the 
state mandate was introduced.  Thus already before an affordable housing  plan was required 
by the IAHPA a plan was made, making them a progressive community on affordable 
housing. The city is one of the few suburbs which relies on a history of earlier efforts to 
promote affordable housing. It is therefore not surprising that Smith, Housing Planner of the 
City of Highland Park states that the act is a good idea to encourage affordable housing. 
However, for city officials of Highland Park, the act itself has not become a hot topic since it 
was introduced in 2004, because they have been actively already involved in facilitating 
affordable housing in their community. 
 
Being active on affordable housing, city planners in Highland Park are facing several 
problems. On of the problem is that affordable housing developers are hard to find. Most of 
the private  developers prefer to built market rate housing, because it generates more profit 
(Smith, 2007). Moreover, most of developers in the non-profit association Illinois Housing 
Council (IHC) invest very little in North and Western suburbs in the Chicago Metropolitan 
Area, because land costs are high and zoning codes are restricted to built affordable housing, Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
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which is mostly high dense. Zoning codes in the more wealthy suburbs are focused on single-
family housing, and excludes housing for low- and moderate households. These zoning 
barriers makes it difficult for developers to get a permit to develop of high dense affordable 
housing. Therefore, according to affordable housing promoters, communities have to change 
their plans to make it easier for developers to create affordable housing. As it takes more 
effort for municipalities to create affordable housing, the question is if they are willing to do it 
(Brunick, 2007). That is why incentives and funds from higher governments are needed to 
stimulate the development of affordable housing. Especially for communities that have not 
been active in affordable housing in the past, incentives are a requirement for encouraging 
those communities to invest in affordable housing (Brunick, 2007).  
 
As like other municipalities have said, Smith states that the Illinois act misses the necessary 
funds to encourage local governments to be active in affordable housing. Such an unfunded 
mandate is not popular by local government, since they have to put own funds to facilitate 
affordable housing. This may result in an inactive role towards affordable housing (Pendall, 
2001). In the perspective of municipalities, their tax base is very important. Affordable 
housing generates less tax revenues than large lot single family housing. In addition, high 
income households are paying more taxes and are in need of less services than that low-
income households. So for municipalities it is more beneficial if they attract high-income 
households. The research of Basolo (1999-1) reflects this, when arguing that communities try 
to deliver the best/cost ratio for public goods and services to keep and attract mainly high-
income residents. Without funds from the state, the mandate will be costly for a municipality, 
therefore the question is if the willingness to take action is high. 
 
Smith further claims that the Illinois act can learn from the mandate in Massachusetts (see 
chapter three). This state has done a lot more to encourage affordable housing. One good 
aspect of the Massachusetts act is that it allows comprehensive permits. This means that 
developers can built under this permit rather than they have to pass all sort of different 
permits and it goes directly to state board, rather than it has to go through all sorts of planning 
commissions (Hennion, 2006). Another good aspect according to Smith is, that the 
Massachusetts act request some finances and identifies where they can get those finances. 
That is an impetus for local governments to create affordable units.  
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However, IHDA does provide some technical assistance periodically to provide training for 
communities about affordable housing and how to facilitate it in their community (Quick, 
2007). One example of a mechanism for more affordable housing which is promoted by 
IDHA and affordable housing agencies is inclusionary zoning. The affordable housing plan of 
Northbrook mentions inclusionary zoning as possible strategy to foster more affordable 
housing. Beside this, according to Smith there is little contact about the act between the state 
agency and local officials.  
 
Many suburban municipalities in the Chicago Metropolitan Area complain that it is hard to 
develop affordable housing, mostly by saying that they are built out. (Brunick, 2007). Smith 
(2007) on the contrary argues this is not a good argument, because Highland Park which has 
little vacant land, shows it can be possible be being active in encouraging and facilitating 
affordable housing. City planners in Highland Park try to cooperate with private parties and 
through inclusionary zoning to make the development of affordable housing possible. Further 
Smith notices that the 10% standard is not that much and it could be more, because the need 
of affordable housing in the Chicago Metropolitan Area is substantial.  
 
To encourage affordable housing in other communities, Highland Park is interested in 
regional corporation, like the Metropolitan Planning Council. The city officials want to look 
at regional solutions for affordable housing, but they found little response among other 
prosperous suburban municipalities in Chicago Metropolitan Area. Those other municipalities 
are more concerned of their own situation and try not to lose residents to neighbouring 
communities (Tiebout, 1956). However, Smith notes that the act has created awareness for the 
affordable housing problem, not only for their community, but also for other less active 
communities.  
 
4.5 Concluding remarks 
The Illinois Affordable Housing Planning and Appeal Act is a good initiative from the state to 
tackle the affordable housing problem. A discussion has been started and affordable housing 
agencies/promoters try to encourage city officials to take action and make residents aware of 
the problem. However, this study shows the act has some disadvantages. First the Illinois act 
is an unfunded mandate, unpopular by local governments. This can result in communities not 
being active to facilitate affordable housing due to the lack of state funding. Further the act Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
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misses incentives to encourage local governments to take action and provide affordable 
housing. 
 
Several city officials of home rule communities are saying the act does not apply to them. 
They claim planning, like affordable housing is a local issue, planning is something where the 
state can have no interference on. An underlying reason is that city officials try to avoid 
redistributive programs, like the Illinois affordable housing mandate. Mandates are costly and 
withouth funds from the state, therefore the willingness from communities to facilitate the 
creation of affordable housing is not high. 
 
As a result of this defensive rhetoric against affordable housing, advocating agencies fear that 
the act wil not be powerful enough to stimulate communities to tackle the affordable housing 
problem. Impulses are needed if the state wants to meet the goals of the mandate. 
 
An impulse could be to put affordable housing in the state capital budget. Several affordable 
housing advocating agencies, like BPI, have been advocating to get this done which will 
generate 100 million dollars a year for new housing. A striking thing is that municipalities 
have not been advocating for this capital bill. This can be seen as a signal of how 
redistributive programs like affordable housing programs are perceived by city officials. The 
state has to come with more strategies to encourage affordable housing in the 49 
noncompliant municipalities. 
 
However, the city of Highland Park shows that it is possible to facilitate affordable housing. 
This community has the commitment, creativity and corporation with developers to make the 
creation of affordable housing happening. Other communities can learn from Highland Park, 
however it seems like they have other priorities than affordable housing. 
 
For the future it will be interesting to see what the State Housing Appeals Board will do. In 
2009 the State Housing Appeals Board is empowered to hear appeals from developers who 
have been denied in their efforts to build affordable housing in one of the 49 communities. 
One of the questions is what the Appeals Board will do to act against the three home rule 
communities that have not adopted a plan.  If it can put the three communities under pressure, Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
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by for example threatening with penalties, the board can show its power and its determination 
to make the mandate successful. 
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5. Dutch reflection on US housing sector 
 
In this section a reflection from the Netherlands on the US housing situation will be given, 
especially on the housing sector for low and moderate income housing. The Netherlands as 
well as the US belong both to the Western culture. However, there are significant differences 
to give when discussing about how planning is being done and how governments give 
directions on housing policies.  
 
 
5.1 Dutch planning system 
 
The Netherlands has a long-standing tradition on spatial planning. Decision making by 
consensus has been the dominant planning style in the Netherlands (Van der Valk, 2002). 
This system  became the leading principle from the 1950s en 1960s. It may be considered 
collaborative planning, in which actors cooperate, become involved in the process of 
developing similar thoughts (Healey, 1997).  This principle based on consensus is also known 
as the ‘poldermodel’. With a strong national government with its extensive welfare system, 
the Netherlands came close to the ideal of a ‘planned society’ (Van der Valk, 2002). A   
technical-rational approach here was seen as the best way to bring the idea of a planned 
society in practice and as the best way for the reconstruction of the country after the damages 
of World War II (De Roo, Voogd, 2004). 
 
In the Netherlands the government system exists of three levels: central government, 
provincial government and municipal government. The three-tiers are autonomous, except for 
certain statutory powers reserved for provinces and central government (Van der Valk, 2002). 
The administrative system is based on a constitution and implementing acts and the process of 
communication between the tiers of government is characterized by consensus building. 
(Faludi and van der Valk, 1994). With Spatial Planning Acts, started in 1965, the central 
government provided a framework, where provinces and municipalities are required to 
comply (Van der Valk, 2002). Three tiers of government have their own planning power, in 
which national and provincial land use plans are broad framework plans and policy 
guidelines. Municipalities have the statutory power to make both framework plans 
(structuurplannen) as well as binding land allocation plans (bestemmingsplannen). The United 
States municipalities have no such framework from the federal government like in the 
Netherlands that requires how to comply. Municipalities are more autonomous and have more 
authority to determine their own planning policy. Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
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Contrary to the American system of local government, Dutch provinces and municipalities all 
have the same statutory powers. There is no legal difference between the municipality of 
Amsterdam with a population of  725,000 and a small municipality of 2000 inhabitants (Van 
der Valk, 2002). In addition, the national government is the main source of income of Dutch 
municipalities, 83 per cent approximately. 37 per cent is distributed through the 
Municipalities Fund, and 46 per cent takes the form of welfare benefits administered at the 
local level. Only 17 per cent of municipal income (2001) comes from local taxation, mainly 
real estate tax (Van der Burg, Dieleman, 2003).  
 
In the last couple of years there is an important turning point noticeable in the Dutch planning 
system. At many departments there is a strong decentralisation of funds, so that coordination 
on national level is not a condition for successful policy. On the field of land policies of 
municipalities there is a tendency of the rise of market parties that claim an greater position in 
the development process. Municipalities have to adjust their way of acting in the process. As 
a result, local governments have become more one of the actors, instead of a strong leading 
actor which they were. The growth of the participation of the private sector in the decision 
making process have led to a rise of public private partnerships (De Roo, Voogd, 2004). 
Further, the consensus model has received complaints about the sticky character of the 
decision-making process (Van der Valk, 2002).  This has led to delayed and complex 
procedures in planning. 
 
5.2 US planning system 
In the United States the planning system is completely different. Local governments have 
more autonomy. There is no such hierarchy between the government levels as in the 
Netherlands.  In the US, local governments exists in different types, like townships, school 
districts and special districts. This makes planning on a local level very complex (Berman, 
2003). For example by 2002, the state of Illinois had 102 counties, 1,291 municipalities, 1,431 
townships, 934 public school districts, and 3,145 special districts. This makes Illinois the state 
with the most local units (City-Data, 2007).   
 
If a community is considered as home rule, it has more autonomy (see chapter 2). Local 
autonomy has a downside for a municipality: they get, in contrast to the Netherlands, very 
little funding from the federal and state government. Municipalities depend more on local Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
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taxes, especially on property taxes. For example, approximately 74 per cent of tax revenues of 
the City of New York comes from local tax (IBO, 2007). The rest is funded by the state and 
federal government. Highland Park, a suburb in the Chicago Metropolitan Area, gets 
approximately 89 per cent of the tax revenues from local tax, the rest derives from state tax 
(City of Highland Park, 2007). Other resources have to come from subsidies, like grants from 
Department of Housing And Urban Development.  
 
From the 1930s to the early 1960s, state governments were the units generally being 
bypassed. States were either pushed aside or voluntarily retreated to the sidelines, while cities 
and the federal government tackled the nation’s important problems. There was a general 
belief that the ‘state governments would be left to decide on unimportant matters (Charles 
Press, 1980). With legislative reapportionment, growing professionalism at the state level, 
changes in federal grants favourable to the states, US Supreme Court rulings protecting states’ 
rights and a greater emphasis in Washington on devolution, the states came back, in recent 
years have increased their role in matters such as education and land-use planning, which 
have traditionally been handled at the local level.  
 
When it came to raising revenues, local governments were still outdoing the state up to the 
late 1960s. But from the end of the end of 1960s the revenues from the state began to exceed 
the revenues of revenues of the local governments. Viewed in terms of their ability to control 
various functions such as education and land use and to generally control financially 
resources, local governments may be said to have lost considerable power. This may not say 
that local government has lost revenues, because there has been a tremendous growth in the 
revenue collections both by state and local governments. Therefore it can be said that both 
became more powerful. 
 
In the 1980s, Reagan argued a decentralist policy, to reduce the power of the federal 
government relative to state and local governments by scaling down to reduce federal 
programs. He also supported the desirability of increasing the discretion of states and 
localities. Reagan challenged the notion that federal grants to state and local governments, in 
general, were necessary and useful (Berman, 2003).  Many of these changes were explicitly 
designed to enhance the power of state government, not only with respect to the federal 
government, but also to local governments as well. But the overall reduction in grants meant Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
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that the resources available to local governments actually decreased, making it more difficult 
for them to support existing spending levels, thus in effect reducing their local autonomy 
(Goldsmith, 1997).  
 
In recent years local officials have had reason to complain about their treatment at the state 
level, although local policies has its influence. Local officials complained about the loss of 
local governmental authority, the lack of sufficient power to generate revenues, the lack of 
support of federal and state agencies, and the lack of support of unfunded mandates. Many 
times local officials have heard that the state would not leave them alone and not giving them 
money. State officials have little to gain by being generous in regard to local revenues and 
authority. (Berman, 2003). During much of the 1990s, local officials were on the defensive, 
trying to hold off costly mandates and protect what funds they had from further cuts. In 1995, 
the complaints from local officials eventually resulted that Congress took a step through the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act to make federal mandating more difficult. To keep off 
policies from higher levels local officials generally try to attach to the home rule principle. 
Sometimes local officials play an offensive role, trying to secure more authority of revenues, 
and sometimes they are more defensive,  trying to protect what they have (Berman, 2003).  
 
5.3 Housing comparison US and Netherlands 
The housing situation of the Netherlands and US are very different from each other. The 
Dutch central government has been an prominent actor in housing, especially after World War 
II, when lots of houses were damaged and were need to rebuild for reconstruction. This led 
the Dutch central government to encourage the construction of affordable housing and the 
central goverment had a significant influence on spatial planning. The ambitious spatial 
planning of the government was supported by a comprehensive housing policy (Priemus, 
1998). Housing associations were for a large part responsible for the construction of social 
housing. They were financed by the central government. Today, social housing has a share of 
33% of the total housing stock (see table 5.1).  
The government’s involvement in social housing today is less influential than it was. From a 
central government with broad public commitment it evolved towards a more market oriented 
government. In this situation, more of the risks have been spread to private actors and local 
governments (Priemus, 1998). One important change was the liberalization process of the Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
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housing associations starting at the end of the 1980’s. It involved that the housing associations 
became more independent from the government. This made them more accountable for their 
own actions. The task of housing associations changed from a  housing manager to a more 
active role on the housing market. The housing associations became ‘civil enterprises’: 
private, professional organizations, responsible for a public task (Ekkers, 2006). Housing 
association became a hybrid organization both with commercial and public developments. 
Conditions to gratify the public task were for example to supply the renting of housing to 
lower-income households and elderly, disabled en persons in need of care and the provision 
of a livable neighbourhood. Housing associations also do not have the right to increase rents 
of social housing, this is a task for the central government. (Ekkers, 2006). 
Comparing the Dutch housing situation with the United States, it can be said that the social 
housing sector of the US is substantially smaller. One of the main reasons behind this is that 
the United States is a liberal welfare state, which emphasize individualism, individual 
responsibility, and a reliance on the private market. In addition, the political climate in the 
United States has a certain hostility towards an active government (Dreier, Hulchanski, 1993). 
In contrast, the Netherlands is a social welfare state where the government has been a major 
player in the development of the country. In the US, most of the housing is constructed by 
private builders and financed by private lenders. American local governments have a 
regulatory approach to housing in their area. Their housing activities have traditionally related 
primarily to enforcement of housing and building codes, through zoning regulations and 
allocating the use of land. However, since the 1980s, local government have been more 
actively involved in housing by using federal funds to support this activity. In addition, a 
small number of local governments have begun to provide subsidized private housing for 
home ownership and rental. Nevertheless, usually housing is not an important issue in 
politics(Wolman & Goldsmith, 1992). 
 
As can be seen in table 5.1,  home-owner ship is about two-thirds of the total housing stock. 
These houses are mostly detached, single-family houses. Social/public assisted housing sector 
in the US in very small. Netherlands, on the other hand, as a social welfare state,  has as 
substantial amount of social housing.  
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Source: Vrom, 2007 & HUD, 2000. 
 
Unlike the Netherlands, the United States has no history of housing associations, but instead 
profit and nonprofit organizations have been the main developers of affordable housing. In the 
1960s and 1970s so called Community Development Corporations (CDC) were formed to 
fight the war against poverty and to gain community control. The biggest players were the 
Ford Foundation and the federal government, later on  the Enterprise Foundation became an 
important player. A lot of the CDC’s that were established were active in business 
development, human services, housing, where other CDC’s were formed by community 
activists, churches and social service agencies. Those early nonprofit organizations had 
modest success in completing development projects, but many of these groups had not enough 
resources to undertake large-scale community development (Dreier and Hulchansky, 1993).  
Since the Reagan Administration’s dramatic cutbacks of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) programs in the early 1980’s, annual funding for HUD dropped from $ 31 billion in 
1981 to $ 14 billion in 1989. As a result, the nation’s supply of affordable subsidized rental 
housing has stagnated and declined.  By the late 1980s, only 29% of the 13,8 million low-
income renter households eligible for federal assistance received any housing subsidy, the 
lowest level of any industrial nation in the world (Dreier, 1997). These developments are also 
noticeable with further cutbacks under the Bush administration. A government official of the 
Bush administration stated that “Housing issues are predominantly local issues [. . . . ]. The 
solution to meeting the nation’s affordable housing needs will not come out of Washington” 
(Broder 2002, p. B7). This reveals the Bush administration’s underlying view that urban 
problems are not really federal responsibilities (Dreier, 2006). In 2000 about 15 million low-
income renter households were eligible for federal housing assistance, only 4 million received 
HUD housing assistance. In the Netherlands about one million households receive housing 
Table 5.1   Percentage of type of housing on total housing stock 
  Ownership  Private Rental Social / public assisted 
housing 
United States  67  31,5  1,5 
The Netherlands  55,9  11  33,1 Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
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subsidies from the federal government, out of a total of seven million households 
(Belastingdienst, 2006).  
As a result of the cutbacks in federal funding for housing programs since the 1980s, nonprofit 
organizations and affordable housing advocating agencies have faced a tremendous challenge.  
In the absence of a major federal low-income housing production program, non-profit groups 
had to work together and share funds from local and state governments and private 
foundations and charities to be successful in community development. Local governments 
began to be more active on public housing developments. As a result a growing number of 
local governments provided support to the nonprofit sector. They stimulated nonprofit groups 
and facilitated developments for housing developments (Dreier and Hulchansky, 1993). 
Private foundations and private business groups played a key role in supporting the nonprofit 
housing sector.. Especially LISC and the Enterprise Foundation have been major catalysts for 
corporate and foundation support to CDCs. Due to their efforts fnance, construction and 
organization development improved. 
 
Despite the growing role of Community Development Corporations they cannot produce even 
close to an adequate supply of housing for the low- and moderate income households, mainly 
because of the lack of subsidies to fill the gap between what it costs to develop housing and 
what the poor can afford to pay (Dreier, 2000). Too few public resources are available for 
CDC’s to significantly expand housing and other development activities. With the Bush 
Administration cutting funds of housing programs, it will be difficult for CDC’s to get more 
funding to develop affordable housing units. In addition, local governments receive less 
grants from the federal government to facilitate more affordable and public housing, this 
result in an ever greater shortage of affordable housing. Also the continuing sub-prime and 
foreclosure crisis has significantly constrained already limited resources for the development 
of affordable housing.  
 
Conclusions 
This chapter explains the housing situation of the housing sector for the low and moderate 
households of the Netherlands and the United States. Although the housing sectors of the 
Netherlands and the United States have always had the same intention of helping low-income 
citizens acquire housing, they have had different histories of governmental support of Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
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nonprofit housing associations. The main difference between the housing sector of the 
Netherlands and the United States has been the government support. For decennia, the Dutch 
government has been an important player in social housing and by giving directions to 
housing associations. The housing associations produced many houses for the social housing 
sector, resulting in one third of the total housing sector as social housing. The social welfare 
system is an important contributor making social housing possible. However, the central 
government has diminished its role in the activity of housing associations and private actors 
have gained more power in decision-making. 
 
In contrast, in the United States there is more resistance towards an active central government. 
A climate exists that emphasizes individualism, own responsibility and a reliance on the 
private market. However, the federal government has several housing programs for low-
income households, but this far from needed. Community Development Corporations have 
grown from the 1970s and have produced more affordable housing over the last years, but still 
the need for affordable housing is enormous. Housing is not a big issue in local politics, so 
stimulation and funds from higher levels are needed to make housing a more important issue. 
Housing must be part of a broader agenda and social and economic reform. However, this 
requires changing national priorities. Housing problems cannot be isolated from other trends 
such as widening income disparities, growing job insecurity, and lack of access to health 
insurance or child care. If the United States federal government should grant the nonprofit 
housing organizations and local governments with more funds to produce more affordable 
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Chapter 6 Conclusions 
 
This chapter will highlight some concluding remarks from the research presented in this 
report. The conclusions are based on the main question of the study: 
 
Has the process of complying with the Illinois Housing Planning Mandate changed the way 
suburban cities in the Chicago Metropolitan Area are approaching affordable housing 
policy? 
 
In this study the compliance of suburban municipalities in the Chicago Metropolitan Area 
towards the affordable housing mandate and their attitude towards affordable housing have 
been reviewed. The aim of this study is to find out if the Illinois Affordable Housing Planning 
and Appeal Act is changing the attitude of the 49 non-compliant suburbs towards affordable 
housing. State officials and affordable housing proponents argue the need for affordable 
housing in the Chicago Metropolitan Area is eminent. Although local officials do agree with 
the direct need for affordable housing, state officials and affordable housing proponents are 
more committed to tackle the affordable housing issue. With problems as the job/housing 
mismatch and zoning barriers in prosperous suburbs state leaders stood up to address the 
problems and introduced the Illinois Affordable Housing Planning and Appeal Act. This 
active attitude is in contradiction with the defensiveness of local officials where the 
willingness of local officials of taking action is lacking. Several theories are giving reasons 
for this defensive attitude.  
 
The public choice theory, discussed in chapter 2, build upon the concept of the Homo 
economicus, - “man being an egoistic, rational utility maximizer” is reflected in this defensive 
attitude. Local officials are driven by selfishness and try to deliver the best services for their 
residents. The defensive attitude derives from affordable housing not being an important issue 
to many prosperous suburbs. Their communities are built to suit low dense, large lot housing 
for mainly prosperous families. However, the concept of homo economicus can also mean an 
active attitude, by trying to attract as much prosperous residents, as can be seen in the 
prosperous suburbs in the Chicago Metropolitan Area. One of the main goals of local officials 
from prosperous suburbs is to attract high-income households which generates more taxes 
than low income households. As argued in the theory by Tiebout (1956) local officials try to Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
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deliver the best benefit/cost ratio to their residents and to attract more residents. In this 
situation, local government officials show a self-interested behaviour. Local officials pay 
attention to their mainly wealthy residents to keep them satisfied rather than offer 
redistributive programs like affordable housing programs.  These programs will be avoided as 
much as possible, especially in prosperous suburbs in the Chicago Metropolitan Area, where 
affordable housing is not one of the main priorities municipalities. Although local politicians 
are aware of the lack of affordable housing that is present in their region, they do not consider 
it is their responsibility to create possibilities for more affordable housing in their community. 
Especially prosperous suburbs are able to support redistributive policies like affordable 
housing projects, with tax revenues from high-income residents they receive. However local 
officials are reluctant to offer these affordable housing projects, several communities even  
have zoning barriers making the development affordable housing hardly possible. These 
barriers have contributed only more to the shortage of affordable housing. Certain zoning 
requirements make it very hard for developers to build affordable housing. Out of fear for the 
rejection from prosperous residents of additional low-income residents and policies 
favourable to them (Downs, 1994),  resulting that residents may “vote with their feet” 
(Tiebout, 1956), by moving away, local officials have reason to show a defensive attitude 
towards affordable housing.   
 
To avoid the movement of prosperous suburban residents, several  communities use their 
home rule authority to come up with arguments that housing is a local issue, and not an issue 
for a state to intervene in. This home rule provision says that a home rule unit “may exercise 
any power and perform any function pertaining to its governments and affairs including but 
not limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals and 
welfare; to license; to tax; and to incur debt.” (Illinois Constitution, 1970). This includes the 
power to enact zoning restrictions, and for example exclusionary zoning. In a decentralized 
country as the United States it is common that policies are regulated on a local level and that 
state and/or federal policies are not always wanted by local government officials. The home 
rule concept has given suburbs even more autonomy to decide on issues in their community, 
without the interference of the state. Knowing that home rule is giving communities more 
local autonomy, suburbs try to use this provision to escape from the act, by saying that the 
state has no right to interfere in a local issue like affordable housing. However,  in the official Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
   
 
  
   64 
  
document of the act,  the act does not specifically provide a exemption for home rule 
communities.   
 
 
These arguments concerning home rule provision can result in tensions between local and 
state level, as already happened with three suburbs not willing to comply to the mandate, 
arguing home rule sets them free from the act. In the theory (chapter 2) five areas of state-
local conflicts have been mentioned (Wright, 1982). One of them are conflicts in authority in 
the fields of land use and building. This is surely the case for the affordable housing mandate 
in Illinois. Local officials are trying to secure their authority, while state officials try to solve 
statewide problems as the shortage of affordable housing in this case. The question is if the 
state has, through the State Housing Appeals Board, enough authority to determine that local 
housing policies has to change in order to get more affordable housing. If the authority of the 
state is missing, it can be doubtful if the mandate will meet its goals. However, mandates can 
be successful as the affordable housing mandate in Massachusetts (see chapter 3) has shown 
in the last 30 years. With incentives and strong rules the mandate have resulted in a 
substantial development of affordable housing. The state of Illinois should take lessons from 
the mandate of Massachusetts, by giving the Illinois mandate more incentives, funds and 
strength. 
 
Despite the defensive attitude towards affordable housing among several prosperous suburbs, 
the suburb Highland Park is a positive exception among the 49 noncompliant suburbs. This 
community has been active on affordable housing from the 1970s and shows with an 
comprehensive affordable housing plan their commitment to the act. This should be a signal 
to the other municipalities that the facilitation of affordable housing can be done, if there is 
willingness to do it, without rejection on moving away by prosperous citizens.  
 
From a Dutch point of view,  the US housing situation can be put in a different perspective. 
Although both countries are wealthy western countries, they are different. Governments in the 
United States are not active on housing issues in comparison with the Netherlands. The 
housing department of the federal government is substantially smaller than the Dutch 
equivalent, which has been a very active player in housing. In addition, US is a decentralized 
country, where much is decided on a local level. As a result local officials have more Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
   
 
  
   65 
  
autonomy to decide on issues like affordable housing and that is why between communities 
differences can be seen in the amount of affordable housing. Affordable housing is not a high 
priority for every community. Local governments mainly focus on their self-interest and their 
residents. That is why in a wealthy suburb affordable housing is not an important issue. Their 
main goal is not to facilitate affordable housing, but to create conditions to attract high 
income households. From a local official’s point of view this strategy is justifiable, because 
local officials have the autonomy to decide their own policies. That is why some local 
officials among the 49 prosperous suburbs show opposition to the mandate, because their 
autonomy concerning housing is in question. 
 
Where the United States is a decentralized country, the Netherlands consists of a more top-
down approach where policies are mainly decided by an active central government. Dutch 
municipalities do not have such local authority as home rule communities do in the United 
States. They are more bounded on legislation from higher levels. Zoning barriers being used 
by prosperous suburbs to keep off low income households, are not present in the Netherlands, 
where the equality principle plays an important part and legislation is not giving space for 
such zoning barriers.  
 
The social welfare state system in the Netherlands led by an active central government, has 
resulted in the development of many affordable housing, mainly through policies and the 
central government’s influence in housing associations. The housing associations were 
responsible for most of affordable housing being build. The equity principle plays an 
important part in this, in contradiction to the United States. From a Dutch perspective it might 
be striking that the central government in the US does so little on housing, where from an 
American perspective with principles as individual responsibility and reliance on market 
forces this might not be so strange. Problems as suburban residential inequality and 
segregation as visible in the Chicago Metropolitan Area are not as substantial as in the 
Netherlands. Through policies of the central government, these problems have not developed 
so dramatically as in the United States. This is one the differences in approach of the Dutch 
and American government: the first is more committed on helping its inhabitants, by making 
social laws, the second is more based on freedom and individualism.  
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Returning back on the Illinois Affordable Housing Planning and Appeal Act, it can be 
concluded that up till now the act is perceived as a weak mandate according to most of the 
actors. For the future an upgrade is needed to do more than only creating awareness among 
the 49 communities. Though with issues as home rule power this may be hard to establish.  
One of the questions will be if communities have the willingness to bring down zoning 
barriers and allow the housing market to meet the market demand of working families for 
decent affordable housing. If the state of Illinois does not put the communities more under 
pressure to take action, the effectiveness of the mandate will be doubtful. Affordable Housing in Suburban Chicago 
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These are the people who have been interviewed during this study. Among them are 
government officials and people of advocating agencies. 
 
 
Nick Brunick, Chicago, Illinois, 21
st November, 2007. 
Nick Brunick works for Applegate & Thorne-Thompsen, P.C. as an attorney and worked for 
Business and Professional People for the Public Interest, a public interest law and policy 
center. As employee for BPI, Brunick was on of the promoters of the Illinois Affordable 
Housing Planning and Appeal Act 
 
Margaret Feit Clarke, Winnetka, Illinois, 30
th October, 2007. 
Margaret Feit Clarke works for Interfaith Housing Center of the Northern Suburbs as Director 
of Communications & Agency. This organisation advocates for fair and affordable housing in 
north suburban Chicago 
 
Charles Hoch, Chicago, Illinois, 10
th October, 2007. 
Charles Hoch works at the College of Urban Planning and Public Affairs. He  studies urban 
planning practice and did research on how local municipal officals responded to the Illinois 
Affordable Housing Planning and Appeal Act. 
 
Mary Smith, Highland Park, Illinois, 30
th October, 2007. 
Mary Smith works for Highland Park Housing Commission as housing planner. The Highland 
Park Housing Commission was created in 1973 to encourage and engage in the development 
of low-and-moderate income housing.  
 
Alan Quick, Chicago, Illinois, 28
th November, 2007. 
Alan Quick works at the Illinois Housing Development Authority (IHDA), primary as policy 
person for Illinois Affordable Housing Planning and Appeal Act. 
 
Susannah Levine, Chicago, Illinois, 21
st November, 2007 
Susannah Levine is an employee of Business and Professional People for the Public Interest 
(BPI). She is a senior policy analyst and engaged in affordable housing. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 